This petition calls for the U.S. government to prohibit the funding of any activity that intentionally creates, reconstructs or alters a pathogen to become deadlier or more transmissible to humans (with respect to any pathogen that currently exists in nature), or to become more resistant to existing drugs, treatments or vaccines.

In 2015, scientists created a bat coronavirus that was adapted to infect human airway cells. This "chimeric virus" was not celebrated by all members of the scientific community. “The only impact of this work is the creation, in a lab, of a new, non-natural risk,” said Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist and biodefence expert at Rutgers University. “If the virus escaped, nobody could predict the trajectory,” said Simon Wain-Hobson, a virologist at the Pasteur Institute in Paris.

The U.S. government stopped funding gain-of-function experiments involving influenza, SARS, and MERS viruses in Oct. 2014 (granting exception to the experiment above); however, this moratorium was lifted in Dec. 2017. To allow this type of research to continue poses an exceptional and potentially catastrophic risk to not only U.S. citizens, but to all citizens of the world. There are several compounding sub-risks which include:

Risk of Human Error

Lab accidents are disturbingly common. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) concluded that breaches of safety procedures at one of Beijing's top virology laboratories were the probable cause of a deadly outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2004. 

“Clearly there was a link to the Institute of Virology, and our investigations are still ongoing, but we haven't found a single incident that links the two cases of laboratory workers at the institute, so it appears to be two separate breaches of bio-safety, and we can't find any single incident or accident that explains either case. It has raised real concerns about bio-safety in general, how bio-safety guidelines are implemented, and how that is supervised and monitored," said Dr. Julie Hall, WHO's coordinator in China of communicable disease surveillance and response at the time.

Dr. Hall continued, “We are lucky that [the patient] travelled on a train and not on an international flight..."

The event described above was the third outbreak of SARS to have been traced to a laboratory in Asia, although, severe breaches have also occurred in the U.S. 

In 2014, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta unknowingly sent live samples of anthrax to other laboratories where as many as 84 workers were accidentally exposed. This containment breach was the result of multiple violations of safety procedure. “If this had been a highly contagious bird flu that they were working with instead of anthrax, I’d be scared to death,” said Lynn Klotz, a biosecurity expert at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, D.C.

Risk of Human Frailty

Scientists, like all humans, are susceptible to bouts of addiction, depression or other treatable forms of mental illness that can compromise their ability to make sound and rational decisions. There is no shame in this reality, but, it does pose unique risks and ethical dilemmas. For example, under what circumstances does a threat to public safety outweigh the requirements of medical confidentiality?

The Germanwings Flight 9525 tragedy is a reasonable analogue. Investigators concluded that the co-pilot, Andreas Lubitz, deliberately crashed the plane, killing all 150 aboard. Multiple doctors felt that Lubitz was psychologically unstable and unfit to fly, yet none of those doctors reported this information to Lubitz's employer because of medical secrecy requirements, according to Brice Robin, a French state prosecutor.

It is not unreasonable to believe that an individual working in the field of molecular biology has suffered from a condition that might similarly impair his or her judgment.

Risk of Political Interference

Politically-motivated decisions have compromised international scientific cooperation and put the world in danger. For example, the Chinese government intentionally withheld information during the crucial beginnings of the SARS-CoV-1 epidemic, which began when the first case of atypical pneumonia was reported in the Guangdong province in Nov. 2002. It wasn't until Feb. 11, 2003 that Guangdong health officials publicly acknowledged the disease, also admitting that there were no effective drugs to treat the disease and that the outbreak was not fully contained. (The minister of health and the mayor of Beijing were fired soon afterwards.)

Notwithstanding, the U.S. government has also been accused of anti-scientific behavior. In 2007, former Surgeon General Richard H. Carmona reported to a House of Representatives committee that political appointees had censored speeches, suppressed scientific reports and restricted media opportunities during his term as the nation's leading doctor.

When dealing with lab-made pathogens that pose a risk to the entire world, it is reasonable to believe that there is a greater political incentive (or personal incentive) to withhold or manipulate data, or to lie outright, in the event of a breach.

Risk of Ignorant Custodianship

The odds of a catastrophic public health event clearly increase when dangerous materials are controlled by individuals who lack a sufficient scientific background. This risk is even greater during times of political instability, warfare or other forms of social unrest.

For historical perspective, a nuclear criticality incident in Oak Ridge, Tennessee was allegedly avoided by happenstance during World War II. The plant had collected and stored radioactive materials in a manner that was consistent with Lieutenant General Leslie Richard Groves Jr.'s "need to know" information restriction policy. Notwithstanding, a visiting scientist, Richard Feynman, saw the potential for catastrophe and engineered stricter safety protocols.

Since 2000, the year that scientists constructed a mutant form of coronavirus that was capable of crossing species, the world has witnessed the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, war in Afghanistan and Iraq, a global financial crisis, The Arab Spring, The Ukrainian Revolution, massive protests in Hong Kong, Russia and India, a deadly insurrection in the U.S., and a military coup in Myanmar. 

These events, though unrelated to science per se, compound to make risky scientific research even riskier.

Risk of Malice or Intentional Harm

Gain-of-function research is often referred to as "dual use research," meaning that it can be used for good or used for harm. If used solely for good in a world with no political rivalries, this type of experimentation would still pose the perpetual risk of unintentional harm. Alas, we live in an imperfect world where many governments and individuals, elected or imposed, act with a clear intention to harm others. This reality suggests that on a long enough timeline, the risks of gain-of-function research outweigh the potential rewards.

In Defense of the Researchers

Nothing written above is intended to disparage the scientists who conduct gain-of-function research nor to question their motives for performing this research. These pioneers are both brilliant and brave, risking their own lives to advance our medical understanding.

To end gain-of-function research is to upend the passion and livelihoods of these individuals and to sacrifice, by force, decades of investment in this field of science. Nevertheless, there is a reasonable argument to be made that to do so is in the greater interest of worldwide public health and safety.