Vacate multiple gun convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

Vacate multiple gun convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

The Issue

EQUAL JUSTICE 

My name is Daryl P. Camps and I was found guilty of multiple § 924(c) gun violations that resulted in a sentence of 45 years. Co-defendants Cecil Jackson received 145 years, Orrin Jackson 65 years, Eric Whitener 105 years, and Gary Davis 25 years.

Since the time of our convictions and sentences, there has been a growing split (10-2) between the Court of Appeals concerning the correctness of imposing multiple § 924(c) gun sentences during a single drug crime, which in our case was the drug conspiracy itself. Today, the circuit split on this question is now ten court of appeals having held that multiple § 924(c) gun sentences are not permissible when only a single drug crime is charged. See: United States v. Diaz, 592 F.3d 467 (3rd Cir. 2010).​

In August 1999, the Justice Department's criminal division issued a memorandum that directed United States Attorney's Offices to base each § 924(c) gun count in an indictment upon a separate predicate offense (crime). The policy addressed the 10-2 split between the Court of Appeals on the question of whether the proper unit of prosecution under § 924(c)'s gun statute for using and carrying of a firearm was the "use" of the firearm, or the "underlying predicate drug crime." SEE, (Department of Justice Policy, captioned Multiple Convictions under 18 U.S.C § 924(c) and Firearms Manual).

To simplify what the foregoing issue involves, say a defendant is involved in a conspiracy to sell drugs lasting for a period of five days. Under § 924(c) "using and carrying a firearm" provision, the law allows a defendant to be punished with a five year sentence for using or carrying that firearm during the drug crime of conspiracy. But the question here is, can a defendant be punished multiple times for each time he carries a firearm during the five day conspiracy or because the conspiracy is a single crime, should he be punished only once? The Department of Justice as well as the majority of the Court of Appeals have stated that we should have been given only a five year sentence because the conspiracy is only a single crime and each § 924(c) must be based on a separate drug crime. Based on today's policy from THE DEPT OF JUSTICE, I would have five years for the § 924(c) conviction, consecutive to my drug sentence, rather than 45 years and the same would apply to the other co-defendants.

This is why my codefendants and I need your support as we seek an equitable solution to the quagmire we find ourselves in. We ask the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT to apply the 1999 memorandum § 924(c) to our case to create uniformity and equal justice. To support our efforts, please sign our petition and thank you very much for helping us.

For more information and further explanation, please keep reading.

The Fourth Circuit along with the Eighth Circuit on this issue has ruled in my appeal that multiple § 924(c) convictions and sentences are permissible during a single drug crime. See: United States v. Camps​, Brief and Opinion (4th Cir. 1994). The problem, however, is that in spite of the existing split, there exist absolutely no chance that this split will ever be resolved, leaving me and my co-defendants in the conundrum of serving out a sentence that the United States Supreme Court will ever decide has been correctly applied or not. 

The Department of Justice among other things stated to the court that after the policy issuance that it was unaware of any other prosecutions and anticipated that prosecutions would continue to follow the policy. It then went on to state that because of the policy change, the conflict among the court of appeal is of little and continuing significance, and does not require the court's resolution, although there still exist many of us serving massive sentences convicted prior to this policy. (See: United States Brief in Opposition to Keisha Carter Petition for Certiorari, pag. 7-8).

From the view of the department of justice, in changing its policy was nothing short of acknowledging that the law I had previously argued on appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1994 would indicate that the interpretation of the law by the Court of Appeals was incorrect. It’s just not fair or equal justice that we be treated this way, especially after having read from various individuals such as Justice O’Connor that “the fundamental principle of our constitution, is that a single sovereign law should be equally applied to all.” See Our Judicial Federalism, 35 Case W. Res. Law Review 1, 4 (1985). William Rehnquist wrote that “Surely it is hard to dispute that, in a country with a national government such as ours, congress should not be held to have laid down one rule in North Carolina and another rule in North Dakota simply because the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagree with one another on the meaning of a Federal Statute.” Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 Fla St. U.L. Law Rev, 1, 11-12 (1986).

In WILLIAMS V. UNITED STATES (4TH CIR) ON APPEAL, the Fourth Circuit Court allowed WILLIAMS to have the policy applied. There probably will never exist an opportunity for a § 924(c) case to be heard, as is demonstrated by the government even in cases that were prosecuted after the policy, quickly moving to dismiss those counts. See: UNITED STATES V. HARDWICK, 544 f.3d 565, 574 (3rd Cir. 2008) government agreed that the multiple consecutive sentences imposed on Hardwick, Murray, and Resto under § 924(c) should be remanded with instructions to vacate all but one § 924(c) conviction each, in compliance with The Justice Department's policy requiring a separate predicate offense for each § 924(c) charge. Former Attorney General Eric Holder himself stated "persons who commit similar crimes and have similar culpability should, to the extent possible, be treated similarly.” Attorney Eric Holder, Jr. May, 2010.

The Department of Justice Action deprived us of the right to at least at some point be treated equally under the law. And if the DOJ felt that a change in policy was needed to protect future defendants, it seems as an equitable matter; the same should be applied to those who come before the policy change. As you can see from the policy Memorandum, my case, Camps, was the case that the Assistant Attorney General disagreed with. So why should I be subject to something that everyone knows was based on an incorrect interpretation of the statute. Considering how President Obama is always stating how everyone should be treated equally under the laws, maybe someone inside his Justice Department can make that a reality. Fairness dictates that some type of remedy occur under the facts of my case.  

Despite the procedural posture of our case, the United States has the legal authority in the interest of justice to seek dismissal under Rule 48(a), as was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in RICE V. RIVERA, 617 F.3d 802 (4th Cir. 2010) which recognized that "a court has little discretion in considering a government's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 49(a), even in situations where convictions are final." In Rice, the government made a good faith motion under Rule 48(a) to dismiss a § 924(c) count rendered invalid by the Supreme Court decision in BAILEY V. UNITED STATES, 516 U.S 137 (1995) as Rice had no judicial remedy available. The U.S. Attorney considering everything, including the fact that we have served 23 to 25 years should do likewise and at least consider dismissing the multiple § 924(c) offenses.

What I am suggesting is not unprecedented. Not too long ago, such an example took place in the case of FRANCOIS HOLLOWAY V. UNITED STATES where the future Attorney General of the United States Loretta Lynch and current United States Attorney, after being asked by Federal Judge Gleeson to consider dismissing Holloway’s stacked § 924(c) sentence totaling 45 years so that he could impose a more just sentence, agreed to the request by filing a rule 48(a) dismissal. The judge in applauding U.S. Attorney Lynch action stated that prosecutors have the power to remedy such injustices. Holloway's multiple § 924(c) offenses are nowhere near what we are experiencing. His stacked sentences were legal, under DEAL V. UNITED STATES, whereas its clearly questionable whether our multiple § 924(c) offenses based on a single drug crime were legal, especially considering ten court of appeals held its not legal as well as the Department of Justice changing its policy supporting that multiple § 924(c)s shouldn't be imposed.

We are seeking signatures to our petition to the United States Attorney in gaining a fair and equitable resolution to our multiple stacked 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) sentences. If you believe this is a miscarriage of justice based on what you have read above and you believe the United States Attorney should use her authority to correct an inequity, to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment for the offense, please sign our petitions.

​Thank you very much and we appreciate your support.

This petition had 353 supporters

The Issue

EQUAL JUSTICE 

My name is Daryl P. Camps and I was found guilty of multiple § 924(c) gun violations that resulted in a sentence of 45 years. Co-defendants Cecil Jackson received 145 years, Orrin Jackson 65 years, Eric Whitener 105 years, and Gary Davis 25 years.

Since the time of our convictions and sentences, there has been a growing split (10-2) between the Court of Appeals concerning the correctness of imposing multiple § 924(c) gun sentences during a single drug crime, which in our case was the drug conspiracy itself. Today, the circuit split on this question is now ten court of appeals having held that multiple § 924(c) gun sentences are not permissible when only a single drug crime is charged. See: United States v. Diaz, 592 F.3d 467 (3rd Cir. 2010).​

In August 1999, the Justice Department's criminal division issued a memorandum that directed United States Attorney's Offices to base each § 924(c) gun count in an indictment upon a separate predicate offense (crime). The policy addressed the 10-2 split between the Court of Appeals on the question of whether the proper unit of prosecution under § 924(c)'s gun statute for using and carrying of a firearm was the "use" of the firearm, or the "underlying predicate drug crime." SEE, (Department of Justice Policy, captioned Multiple Convictions under 18 U.S.C § 924(c) and Firearms Manual).

To simplify what the foregoing issue involves, say a defendant is involved in a conspiracy to sell drugs lasting for a period of five days. Under § 924(c) "using and carrying a firearm" provision, the law allows a defendant to be punished with a five year sentence for using or carrying that firearm during the drug crime of conspiracy. But the question here is, can a defendant be punished multiple times for each time he carries a firearm during the five day conspiracy or because the conspiracy is a single crime, should he be punished only once? The Department of Justice as well as the majority of the Court of Appeals have stated that we should have been given only a five year sentence because the conspiracy is only a single crime and each § 924(c) must be based on a separate drug crime. Based on today's policy from THE DEPT OF JUSTICE, I would have five years for the § 924(c) conviction, consecutive to my drug sentence, rather than 45 years and the same would apply to the other co-defendants.

This is why my codefendants and I need your support as we seek an equitable solution to the quagmire we find ourselves in. We ask the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT to apply the 1999 memorandum § 924(c) to our case to create uniformity and equal justice. To support our efforts, please sign our petition and thank you very much for helping us.

For more information and further explanation, please keep reading.

The Fourth Circuit along with the Eighth Circuit on this issue has ruled in my appeal that multiple § 924(c) convictions and sentences are permissible during a single drug crime. See: United States v. Camps​, Brief and Opinion (4th Cir. 1994). The problem, however, is that in spite of the existing split, there exist absolutely no chance that this split will ever be resolved, leaving me and my co-defendants in the conundrum of serving out a sentence that the United States Supreme Court will ever decide has been correctly applied or not. 

The Department of Justice among other things stated to the court that after the policy issuance that it was unaware of any other prosecutions and anticipated that prosecutions would continue to follow the policy. It then went on to state that because of the policy change, the conflict among the court of appeal is of little and continuing significance, and does not require the court's resolution, although there still exist many of us serving massive sentences convicted prior to this policy. (See: United States Brief in Opposition to Keisha Carter Petition for Certiorari, pag. 7-8).

From the view of the department of justice, in changing its policy was nothing short of acknowledging that the law I had previously argued on appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1994 would indicate that the interpretation of the law by the Court of Appeals was incorrect. It’s just not fair or equal justice that we be treated this way, especially after having read from various individuals such as Justice O’Connor that “the fundamental principle of our constitution, is that a single sovereign law should be equally applied to all.” See Our Judicial Federalism, 35 Case W. Res. Law Review 1, 4 (1985). William Rehnquist wrote that “Surely it is hard to dispute that, in a country with a national government such as ours, congress should not be held to have laid down one rule in North Carolina and another rule in North Dakota simply because the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagree with one another on the meaning of a Federal Statute.” Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 Fla St. U.L. Law Rev, 1, 11-12 (1986).

In WILLIAMS V. UNITED STATES (4TH CIR) ON APPEAL, the Fourth Circuit Court allowed WILLIAMS to have the policy applied. There probably will never exist an opportunity for a § 924(c) case to be heard, as is demonstrated by the government even in cases that were prosecuted after the policy, quickly moving to dismiss those counts. See: UNITED STATES V. HARDWICK, 544 f.3d 565, 574 (3rd Cir. 2008) government agreed that the multiple consecutive sentences imposed on Hardwick, Murray, and Resto under § 924(c) should be remanded with instructions to vacate all but one § 924(c) conviction each, in compliance with The Justice Department's policy requiring a separate predicate offense for each § 924(c) charge. Former Attorney General Eric Holder himself stated "persons who commit similar crimes and have similar culpability should, to the extent possible, be treated similarly.” Attorney Eric Holder, Jr. May, 2010.

The Department of Justice Action deprived us of the right to at least at some point be treated equally under the law. And if the DOJ felt that a change in policy was needed to protect future defendants, it seems as an equitable matter; the same should be applied to those who come before the policy change. As you can see from the policy Memorandum, my case, Camps, was the case that the Assistant Attorney General disagreed with. So why should I be subject to something that everyone knows was based on an incorrect interpretation of the statute. Considering how President Obama is always stating how everyone should be treated equally under the laws, maybe someone inside his Justice Department can make that a reality. Fairness dictates that some type of remedy occur under the facts of my case.  

Despite the procedural posture of our case, the United States has the legal authority in the interest of justice to seek dismissal under Rule 48(a), as was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in RICE V. RIVERA, 617 F.3d 802 (4th Cir. 2010) which recognized that "a court has little discretion in considering a government's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 49(a), even in situations where convictions are final." In Rice, the government made a good faith motion under Rule 48(a) to dismiss a § 924(c) count rendered invalid by the Supreme Court decision in BAILEY V. UNITED STATES, 516 U.S 137 (1995) as Rice had no judicial remedy available. The U.S. Attorney considering everything, including the fact that we have served 23 to 25 years should do likewise and at least consider dismissing the multiple § 924(c) offenses.

What I am suggesting is not unprecedented. Not too long ago, such an example took place in the case of FRANCOIS HOLLOWAY V. UNITED STATES where the future Attorney General of the United States Loretta Lynch and current United States Attorney, after being asked by Federal Judge Gleeson to consider dismissing Holloway’s stacked § 924(c) sentence totaling 45 years so that he could impose a more just sentence, agreed to the request by filing a rule 48(a) dismissal. The judge in applauding U.S. Attorney Lynch action stated that prosecutors have the power to remedy such injustices. Holloway's multiple § 924(c) offenses are nowhere near what we are experiencing. His stacked sentences were legal, under DEAL V. UNITED STATES, whereas its clearly questionable whether our multiple § 924(c) offenses based on a single drug crime were legal, especially considering ten court of appeals held its not legal as well as the Department of Justice changing its policy supporting that multiple § 924(c)s shouldn't be imposed.

We are seeking signatures to our petition to the United States Attorney in gaining a fair and equitable resolution to our multiple stacked 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) sentences. If you believe this is a miscarriage of justice based on what you have read above and you believe the United States Attorney should use her authority to correct an inequity, to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment for the offense, please sign our petitions.

​Thank you very much and we appreciate your support.

The Decision Makers

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY OFFICE, THE JUSTICE DEPT
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY OFFICE, THE JUSTICE DEPT

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