Short Description: We urge UK authorities to crack down on unregulated Iranian currency exchange and remittance businesses operating in Britain. In particular, Kiyan Exchange/ Kixy Ltd in London advertises itself as “under FCA supervision” but is not registered or authorized by the Financial Conduct Authority. This petition calls for an immediate investigation by regulators (FCA, HMRC, OFSI) into Kiyan Exchange and similar operators, enforcement of anti-money laundering laws, and protection of the Iranian diaspora from misleading and illicit financial services.

 Background: How Currency Exchanges Are Regulated in the UK
In the UK, money transfer and currency exchange firms (often called money service businesses, MSBs) must follow strict laws to protect consumers and prevent financial crime. Under the Payment Services Regulations, any business offering money remittance (international or domestic money transfers) must be authorized by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) as a payment institution, or registered as a Small Payment Institution (SPI) if it meets certain thresholds. These firms are subject to fit-and-proper checks, capital requirements, and ongoing supervision by the FCA to ensure they operate safely and honestly.

If a firm only performs currency exchange (bureau de change) or check cashing and is not FCA-authorised, it still must register with HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) for anti-money laundering (AML) supervision. HMRC is the supervisory authority for MSBs not overseen by the FCA. It is illegal to operate an MSB without the proper registration or authorisation. In fact, UK law states that a business must not trade in a regulated sector without AML registration; “Trading while not registered is a criminal offence” and can lead to penalties or prosecution. This dual regime ensures that every currency exchange or remittance provider is either FCA-authorised or at least HMRC-registered, with robust AML controls in place.

In summary, legitimate currency exchange/remittance firms in the UK need: (1) FCA authorisation or SPI status (or be an agent of an authorised firm) to handle money transfers, and (2) HMRC AML registration if they are not FCA-supervised. This framework is meant to protect consumers from fraud and ensure compliance with anti-money laundering and sanctions laws. Any company claiming to offer money transfer services “under FCA supervision” should appear on the FCA’s public register of authorised payment services firms, and all MSBs must be known to HMRC. If a company isn’t on these registers, it is operating outside the law and without oversight.

The Case of Kiyan Exchange – Claims vs. Reality
Kiyan Exchange (also known as “Sarafi Kiyan”) is an Iranian-focused currency exchange and remittance business currently operating in London. On the surface, Kiyan Exchange presents itself as a reputable financial services provider for the Iranian diaspora in the UK and Canada. It is registered as a UK limited company (Company No. 14595720) at 161 Ballards Lane, London – incorporated in January 2023. The company’s own filings, however, suggest it has no substantial declared activity: Kiyan Exchange Ltd is listed as a “dormant” company since incorporation, with minimal accounts. Despite this inactive legal status, the business is actively advertising and transacting as a money transfer service.

Most alarmingly, Kiyan Exchange publicly claims to be licensed and regulated. Its Persian-language promotions explicitly state the service operates “under FCA supervision in the UK” and similarly under FINTRAC in Canada. On its social media and marketing materials, Kiyan portrays itself as an “official” or “legal” exchange, implying it has all required UK approvals. For example, an Iranian business directory describes Kiyan Exchange as a team of specialists whose operations are “under the oversight of financial organizations in England and the EU”. The company’s own website touts “obtaining the necessary licenses” and lists having “official permission to operate in England and Canada” as the number-one reason to trust them. In short, Kiyan Exchange is branding itself as a fully licensed and FCA-regulated entity.

Yet, evidence shows that Kiyan Exchange is not authorised by the FCA. A search of the FCA Financial Services Register finds no record of any firm named “Kiyan Exchange” or “Kiyan Exchange Ltd” as an authorised payment institution, small payment institution, or agent of another firm (as of the date of this petition). Furthermore, community lists of Iranian exchanges in the UK indicate that, unlike properly licensed competitors, Kiyan Exchange holds no FCA or HMRC registration. For instance, a Persian directory of Iranian exchanges shows “Sarafi Bartar London” explicitly noted as holding “FCA and HMRC licenses”, whereas Kiyan Exchange is listed only with an address and contact info and no mention of any licence. In other words, Kiyan Exchange appears in community listings as an exchange service, but with no regulatory status next to its name.

Additionally, Kiyan Exchange’s official corporate registration does not disclose any regulatory permissions. Its Companies House profile classifies it under general financial intermediation (SIC 64999), but there is no indication it has HMRC MSB registration or FCA authorisation. The company’s dormant accounts and low declared assets are inconsistent with the volume of remittance business it claims to conduct. This raises serious questions: How is Kiyan Exchange moving customer funds internationally if it is not an authorised Payment Institution or agent? Operating a money transfer business without FCA approval or HMRC oversight not only violates UK law but also leaves customers exposed to huge risks.

In summary, Kiyan Exchange is advertising itself as a law-abiding, FCA-supervised firm, but in reality it is not on the FCA register and appears to be operating outside the regulated financial system. Its only official standing is a Companies House registration – which is not a license to conduct financial services. This gap between Kiyan’s claims and the official records suggests the public is being misled. We cite these facts to call on regulators to verify Kiyan Exchange’s status and take action against any false claims of authorisation.

What Does Kiyan Exchange Do? (Business Operations and Transfer Routes)
Kiyan Exchange targets the Iranian diaspora community, offering to transfer money and exchange currency between Iran and the UK (and other countries). According to its own advertisements and customer testimonials, Kiyan provides services such as international wire transfers, currency exchange (GBP, EUR, USD, CAD, etc.), student tuition payments abroad, converting cash to Iran’s currency, and facilitating investments or property purchases through fund transfers. It markets itself as a convenient bridge for Iranians who need to send money to family, pay university fees, or move savings overseas – needs that exist because direct banking ties between Iran and the West are severed by sanctions.

Kiyan Exchange highlights that it has a physical branch office in London (161 Ballards Lane, Finchley) where customers can go in person. It also claims to have branches or partners in multiple countries to enable money flows. Notably, Kiyan lists operational presence in Tehran (Iran), Istanbul (Turkey), Dubai (UAE), and Toronto (Canada). These locations are telling: since direct banking to Iran is blocked, Iranian remittance networks often route funds through third countries like the UAE or Turkey (and sometimes Iraqi Kurdistan, e.g. Erbil) to circumvent sanctions. Kiyan’s use of Turkey and Dubai intermediaries is consistent with known informal hawala-style corridors used to move money into Iran. Publicly, Kiyan boasts a global reach – “transferring your money beyond borders” – and even calls itself “a Sarafi as vast as the world”.

However, the operations of Kiyan Exchange are opaque. The business does not publish how it settles funds between the UK and Iran, nor does it provide receipts from regulated bank transfers. In fact, these services likely rely on informal money swap networks: e.g., a customer in London gives GBP to Kiyan’s local account; a partner in Tehran pays out the equivalent in rials to the recipient in Iran (minus commission), and later settlements occur through regional trade or cash smuggling. Kiyan advertises that all its transactions use “official and registered accounts” for safety, yet it provides no proof of regulatory oversight on the UK side. The claim of “100% legal routes” is dubious given the lack of FCA authorisation.

Kiyan’s social media proudly states it operates “with full legal permits” and under regulators’ supervision. For example, its Instagram page in Persian reads: “GBP, USD, and EUR remittances from the UK and Canada under the supervision of FCA UK and FINTRAC Canada”. Despite these claims, none of the required UK permits are actually verifiable. Kiyan’s lack of transparency is also evident in how it handles customer funds. Customers are often asked to pay into private accounts or through third-party bank accounts, rather than a client account of a licensed firm – a common practice among underground sarafs to avoid detection. Such methods mean customers do not truly know where their money goes en route.

Furthermore, there is no consumer protection if something goes wrong. Because Kiyan is not regulated, customers’ funds are not safeguarded under FCA rules, and there is no recourse to the Financial Ombudsman or FSCS if the money disappears. We have seen cases of unlicensed exchanges suddenly shutting down or funds vanishing, leaving victims with no insurance or guarantee. Kiyan Exchange’s heavy marketing in Farsi-language media and Telegram groups – emphasizing speed and good rates – attracts vulnerable community members who may not realize this business is unregulated. By claiming to be “under FCA supervision”, Kiyan gains trust it has not earned. This misleading advertising needs to be addressed urgently to protect consumers.

A Wider Problem: Unregulated Iranian Exchangers in London
The situation with Kiyan Exchange is part of a broader, long-standing problem in the UK. There are numerous unregistered Iranian “sarafi” businesses operating in London and other cities, taking advantage of the demand for money transfers to Iran. While a handful of Iranian exchange firms are fully licensed (estimates of legitimately authorised Iranian MSBs in London range from only about 14 up to 30 at most), the actual number of Iranian-run money exchangers is many times higher. Investigations have suggested there may be up to 200 underground sarafis serving Iranian customers in the UK. These outfits often fly under the radar – no official offices or signage in many cases, just phone numbers circulated in the community.

Why do so many exist? Because sanctions and banking restrictions have created a desperate need for informal value transfer. Yet, enforcement has lagged. Most of these operations are not registered with HMRC or FCA. They typically advertise in Persian-language forums, on social media, or by word-of-mouth, and operate out of back rooms of other businesses. Indeed, some use cover businesses as a front – for example, running a grocery store, travel agency, or retail shop legally, but covertly conducting currency transfers on the side. An exposé from the Iranian community described how certain individuals in Iran print business cards falsely claiming to have a licensed exchange in London; in reality, “they don’t have an exchange at all – they are laundering money”. These unlicensed sarafs secretly bring large sums of cash into the UK, pay no taxes, and operate entirely outside regulatory oversight.

London’s Iranian exchangers have even been linked with Iran’s regime and illicit finance in some cases. Reports from as early as 2012 warned that the unchecked growth of illegal sarafis was “endangering the Iranian community’s security” in Britain. There is concern that some of these money routes could be exploited to fund Iran’s malign activities or facilitate capital flight for corrupt officials. One documented case involved an individual (alias “Saeed”) who ran illicit sarafi operations in the UK while allegedly being connected to the IRGC (Iran’s Revolutionary Guard). Without proper enforcement, underground networks can easily be co-opted for sanctions evasion or even terrorist financing.

Despite these dangers, regulatory action has been minimal. The fact that Kiyan Exchange and many like it operate openly – some even have websites, office addresses, and ads – shows the gaps in enforcement. The law is clear that unregistered MSBs should be shut down, but enforcement agencies face challenges in identifying and prosecuting all offenders. The Iranian diaspora’s needs also complicate matters; authorities are rightly cautious not to punish ordinary people for sending money home. However, turning a blind eye to flagrantly unregulated businesses is not a solution. It leaves the community at the mercy of unscrupulous operators and tarnishes the reputation of legitimate, law-abiding exchange firms.

We believe authorities can draw a line between legal, registered exchanges and “fly-by-night” sarafs. Community-driven initiatives have even tried to compile lists of “safe, licensed Iranian exchanges”, indicating a demand for clarity. But ultimately, enforcement must come from the top. The FCA and HMRC need to actively surveil and weed out entities operating without approval. The Iranian community in the UK deserves access to financial services without having to resort to clandestine channels. By cracking down on illicit exchangers and supporting legitimate ones, regulators will protect consumers and uphold the integrity of the financial system.

Risks to Sanctions Compliance and Consumer Protection
Allowing unregulated exchange businesses like Kiyan to continue operating is dangerous on multiple levels:

Sanctions Evasion & Illicit Finance: Unlicensed money transfer networks can be a gateway for sanctions evasion and even financing of terrorism or the Iranian regime. Because these sarafs operate off the record, they can move funds for blacklisted entities without detection. Recent reports show Iran’s government itself has used exchange offices in third countries to funnel money to proxies. For example, in 2025 the U.S. Treasury revealed that Iran’s IRGC Quds Force transferred over $1 billion to Hezbollah via currency exchange companies and hawala channels, outside formal banking. This illustrates how dangerous unmonitored money networks can be. While Kiyan Exchange serves ordinary customers, the lack of oversight means one cannot know if such networks are also abused by illicit actors. The UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) is tasked with enforcing sanctions compliance – but if firms like Kiyan are invisible to regulators, sanctions laws on Iran can be easily undermined. We raise this issue to protect against the UK unwittingly hosting a hub for regime funds or money laundering.
Misleading Advertising & Diaspora Exploitation: Kiyan Exchange’s target customers are often Iranian students, workers, or families who are not experts in financial regulation. When they see phrases like “under FCA supervision” on ads, they reasonably assume the business is legitimate and their money will be safe. This is deeply misleading. Vulnerable members of the community may be entrusting life savings or critical funds (tuition payments, etc.) to a company that provides no guarantees. If Kiyan or a similar saraf collapses or is shut down, these customers could lose everything with no compensation. It is effectively false advertising to claim regulatory oversight where none exists – a practice that must be stopped to protect consumers.
No Customer Recourse or Safeguards: Transactions through unregulated exchanges are not protected by any consumer protection scheme. Unlike using a bank or authorized payment institution, where there are dispute resolution mechanisms, here the customer’s only “guarantee” is the word of the saraf. If the money never arrives in Iran (or the UK), the customer cannot complain to the FCA or Financial Ombudsman – those bodies have no jurisdiction over an unauthorised firm. Moreover, unregistered MSBs often do not implement proper AML checks or record-keeping. This means customers could inadvertently be involved in a money laundering chain, which is risky for them. Diaspora senders have indeed faced consequences: UK banks often close accounts if they suspect someone used an unofficial money broker to receive funds from Iran. Law-abiding Iranians have been “de-banked” because their transfers (through hawala channels) looked suspicious under sanctions screening. This is an unfair burden on people who turned to these services out of necessity. By eliminating illicit MSBs and offering secure legal channels, we can avoid innocent individuals being ensnared by such collateral damage.
Undermining Legitimate Businesses: Every unregulated saraf that operates with impunity is undercutting those exchange firms that do follow the rules. A few Iranian exchange providers in the UK have gone through the rigorous process of FCA authorisation or HMRC registration, investing in compliance measures. They have to compete with outlaw operators who have lower costs (no compliance, no taxes) and who may lure customers with slightly better rates or faster service (achieved by cutting corners). This creates a perverse incentive for businesses to remain underground. Enforcement and consumer awareness are needed to level the playing field – rewarding compliant firms and driving out rogue ones.
In light of these risks, it is evident that immediate action is needed to address the situation. We cannot wait for a scandal (such as a major fraud, disappearance of funds, or sanctions breach) to occur. The Iranian community in Britain has already suffered from the “shadow banking” problem – from bank account closures to being victims of scam exchanges. Now is the time to ensure all currency exchange and remittance services are properly regulated, transparent, and accountable.

Our Demands and Call to Action
We, the undersigned, urge the relevant UK authorities to take the following actions:

1. Investigate Kiyan Exchange: The Financial Conduct Authority and HMRC should launch a formal investigation into Kiyan Exchange Ltd (161 Ballards Lane, London) and its related entities. Determine on what basis it is operating a remittance service without authorisation. If it is indeed conducting regulated activities illegally, initiate enforcement actions to halt those activities immediately. This includes investigating the individuals in control of Kiyan Exchange and any associated businesses or accounts. The FCA has the power to take action against firms falsely holding themselves out as regulated; this power should be applied to stop Kiyan Exchange from misleading the public.
2. Audit AML Registration and Compliance: We ask HMRC’s Money Laundering Regulations supervision team to confirm whether Kiyan Exchange or any of its proprietors are registered as an MSB for anti-money laundering purposes. If not, this is a breach of the law in itself. HMRC should use its enforcement tools (including penalties and criminal referral if warranted) to sanction any business trading as an MSB without registration. Additionally, if Kiyan (or similar firms) claim to use “official accounts”, those accounts (with UK banks) should be reviewed for compliance. UK banks should be alerted to possible unregistered MSB activity, so they can fulfill their own legal obligations (reporting suspicious activity, not facilitating unlicensed money services).
3. Enforcement Against False Regulatory Claims: It should be made explicitly clear that falsely claiming FCA supervision is unacceptable. The FCA, Advertising Standards Authority (ASA), or Trading Standards should require Kiyan Exchange to cease advertising “under FCA” immediately unless it obtains actual authorisation. Misleading advertising in financial services is harmful and undermines trust. We call on the authorities to issue public warnings about Kiyan Exchange’s status, so consumers are informed that it is not FCA-authorised. The FCA already maintains a warning list of unauthorised firms; if Kiyan or its owners are performing regulated activities, they should be added to this list for consumer awareness.
4. Review by OFSI for Sanctions Implications: The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (HM Treasury) should evaluate whether money flows through networks like Kiyan Exchange pose sanctions risks. OFSI’s mandate is to ensure financial sanctions (including those on Iran) are implemented and enforced. We urge OFSI to use its information-gathering powers to trace if Kiyan Exchange’s transactions circumvent UK sanctions policy. If any breaches are found (even inadvertent), appropriate penalties or referrals should follow. This will send a message that the UK will not allow its financial system to be used for sanctions evasion via unlicensed intermediaries.
5. Publish a Verified List of Legal Iranian Exchanges: We call upon the FCA and/or HMRC to release a public list of firms that are authorised to provide currency exchange or transfer services to Iran (or for Iranian corridors). This list, made accessible in both English and Persian, would help the Iranian-British community easily identify which exchanges are legitimate. Currently, consumers have to dig through the FCA register or rely on word-of-mouth. A clear, government-endorsed list would shine a light on compliant businesses and isolate the dubious ones. Community websites are already attempting to list “صرافی‌های مجاز” (licensed sarafis) – the authorities should support this by providing official data. We also suggest outreach via Iranian community organizations to spread awareness: “Only use FCA-authorised or HMRC-registered exchange services – protect your money.”
6. Prosecute and Close Down Illicit Operators: Ultimately, the goal is to shut down illicit MSBs that refuse to come into compliance. We ask that law enforcement (e.g. the National Crime Agency’s financial crime unit) consider criminal investigations where appropriate – particularly in cases of large-scale unregistered money transmissions, which may involve money laundering offenses. The message must be that the UK is not a safe haven for underground hawala dealers flouting the law. Where needed, use asset freezes or injunctions to stop these businesses. At the same time, regulators can offer a path for those willing to comply (e.g. by encouraging them to apply for SPI status or register and meet standards). But those who continue operating illegally and deceiving consumers should face the full force of the law, up to and including closure of their premises and seizure of any criminal proceeds.
We believe these steps are measured and necessary. This is not about over-burdening small ethnic businesses – it is about protecting the community and the financial system. Honest Iranian-run exchange businesses do exist and many have obtained proper licences; they stand to benefit from the removal of bad actors that undercut trust. The Iranian diaspora in the UK, estimated at around 80,000+, contributes greatly to British society. They deserve the same protection for their remittances and savings as any other community.

By signing this petition, we voice our support for financial transparency, consumer protection, and robust enforcement of UK laws. Kiyan Exchange should not be allowed to operate in the shadows, advertising false assurances. And it should not take a tragedy (such as clients losing money or being implicated in something unlawful) for action to happen.

We appeal to the Financial Conduct Authority, HMRC, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, and other relevant bodies (including the UK Treasury and Home Office) to act now. Investigate, inform, and enforce – make an example of Kiyan Exchange if warranted, and safeguard the community from unregulated financial services. This will build confidence that the UK does not tolerate illicit finance, and that it looks after all residents by ensuring businesses big and small play by the rules.

Together, let’s ensure that “sarafi” services in the UK are safe, legal, and transparent. We seek your support by signing this petition to push for these critical changes and actions.

 

📄 Sources (English)
Companies House – Official company registration for KIYAN EXCHANGE LTD, Company No. 14595720.

Shows company address: 161 Ballards Lane, London, N3 1LJ.
Incorporation date: 16 January 2023.
https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/14595720
Endole Company Profile – Kiyan Exchange Ltd

Indicates the company is classified as Dormant, with no declared business activity or trading accounts filed.
https://suite.endole.co.uk/insight/company/14595720-kiyan-exchange-ltd
SarafiMojaz.com Listing – Public directory of Iranian exchange offices

Lists Kiyan Exchange in London but without any FCA/HMRC license mention, unlike licensed peers.
https://sarafimojaz.com → Search “Kiyan Exchange”
Kiyan Exchange Website – Claims about "official licenses" in UK and Canada

Cites “holding official permits in England and Canada” and “registered accounts”.
https://kiyanexchange.com
Kiyan Exchange Instagram Advertisement (Farsi)

Promotional post claims: “Transfers from the UK and Canada under FCA supervision”.
https://www.instagram.com/kiyanexchange
UK Government – HMRC AML Supervision Guidance

Outlines mandatory registration requirements for all Money Service Businesses.
Operating without HMRC registration is a criminal offence.
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/money-laundering-regulations-registration
FCA Financial Services Register

No listing found for Kiyan Exchange Ltd, confirming no authorisation or SPI/API status.
https://register.fca.org.uk
FATF (Financial Action Task Force) – Describes common sanctions-evasion methods via third countries (e.g., Turkey, UAE, Iraq) and informal value transfer systems (hawala).

https://www.fatf-gafi.org
L'Orient-Le Jour (March 2023) – Based on Wall Street Journal reporting:

Iran’s Quds Force funneled over $1 billion through Dubai-based exchange houses to Hezbollah.
https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1332056/how-iran-funneled-1-billion-to-hezbollah-via-dubai.html
UK Treasury – Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI)

Official guidance and authority on financial sanctions enforcement.
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-financial-sanctions-implementation
The Guardian (June 2017) – UK banks closing accounts of Iranians due to perceived sanctions risk.

Shows the consequences of using informal money channels.
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/jun/10/iranian-bank-accounts-closed-uk-sanctions
SarafiMojaz Campaign – “List of Verified Iranian Exchanges”

Community initiative to highlight licensed Iranian money services operating legally.
https://sarafimojaz.com/verified-sarafis

 

به‌فرمان رهبری جنبش ملی ایران به رهبری شاهزاده رضا پهلوی،کلیه افرادی که به هر شکل با نظام جمهوری اسلامی همکاری مؤثر داشته‌اند،

در چارچوب عدالت و قانون، مورد پیگرد قرار خواهند گرفت.لطفاً با امضای خود از این درخواست حمایت کنید.