UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re:  
Petition for Relief on Behalf of  
ROBERT SYLVESTER KELLY  
_

PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT  
AND MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION  
UNDER FEDERAL LAW

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INTRODUCTION

Petitioner respectfully submits this motion seeking relief from the judgment entered against Robert Sylvester Kelly (“Mr. Kelly”) in the Eastern District of New York. The conviction rests on applications of RICO (18 U.S.C. §1962) and sex‑trafficking statutes (18 U.S.C. §1591) that exceed the statutory boundaries established by the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals.  

The government’s theory—treating Mr. Kelly’s personal relationships, employees, and associates as a criminal “enterprise”—is inconsistent with controlling case law defining the limits of RICO. Likewise, the sex‑trafficking charges were predicated on conduct that does not meet the statutory requirements of commercial sex acts, force, fraud, or coercion, or knowing participation in a trafficking venture.

For these reasons, the conviction should be vacated.

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JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction under:  
- 28 U.S.C. § 2255,  
- 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and  
- The Court’s inherent authority to correct judgments obtained in violation of federal law.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Mr. Kelly was convicted in the Eastern District of New York under theories of RICO racketeering and sex trafficking.  
2. The government alleged that Mr. Kelly’s music career, employees, and personal associates constituted a criminal “enterprise.”  
3. The predicate acts alleged were not independent criminal offenses as required by RICO, nor did they demonstrate continuity or a criminal organizational structure.  
4. The sex‑trafficking charges relied on consensual adult relationships, without evidence of commercial exchange, force, fraud, coercion, or knowing participation in a trafficking venture.  
5. The government’s theory conflicts with established federal precedent.

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LEGAL ARGUMENTS

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I. THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A RICO “ENTERPRISE” AS REQUIRED BY SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

A. Turkette requires an ongoing organization with a common criminal purpose

In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a RICO enterprise must be:

- An ongoing organization,  
- With associates functioning as a continuing unit,  
- Organized around a common criminal purpose.

Application:  
The government relied on Mr. Kelly’s music career and personal relationships—none of which were organized for criminal purposes. No hierarchy, structure, or coordinated criminal objective was demonstrated.

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B. Boyle requires structural features, which were absent here

In Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009), the Court held that an enterprise must have:

- A decision-making structure,  
- Roles,  
- Continuity,  
- Purpose.

Application:  
The government did not show any structured criminal organization. Personal assistants, drivers, and girlfriends do not constitute a criminal enterprise.

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C. Reves requires “operation or management” of a criminal enterprise

In Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993), the Court held that a defendant must direct or control the enterprise’s affairs.

Application:  
The government did not prove that Mr. Kelly directed any criminal enterprise—only that he was a celebrity with employees. That is insufficient under Reves.

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II. THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A “PATTERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY”

A. Sedima requires predicate acts that are independently criminal

In Sedima v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479 (1985), the Court held that RICO requires predicate criminal acts defined in §1961.

Application:  
The government relied on non-criminal conduct—relationship rules, travel, and personal behavior—as predicate acts. These are not crimes under §1961.

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B. H.J. Inc. requires continuity and relationship

In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. 229 (1989), the Court held that a pattern requires:

- Continuity, and  
- Relationship among predicate acts.

Application:  
The alleged acts were isolated, personal, and not part of an ongoing criminal scheme.

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III. THE SEX‑TRAFFICKING CHARGES FAIL UNDER §1591 AND CONTROLLING CASE LAW

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A. Afyare prohibits guilt-by-association

In United States v. Afyare, 632 F. App’x 272 (6th Cir. 2016), the court held:

- Mere association with individuals involved in trafficking is not enough.  
- The government must prove knowing participation in a trafficking venture.

Application:  
The government relied on consensual adult relationships and association—not knowing participation in trafficking.

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B. Todd requires a commercial sex act

In United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 2010), the court held:

- A “commercial sex act” requires something of value exchanged.

Application:  
No evidence showed commercial exchange. Personal relationships are not commercial transactions.

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C. Marcus requires force, fraud, or coercion

In United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2010), the court held:

- Sex‑trafficking requires force, fraud, or coercion.

Application:  
The government did not prove force, fraud, or coercion. Emotional influence or celebrity status does not satisfy §1591.

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IV. THE GOVERNMENT’S THEORY EXPANDS RICO AND §1591 BEYOND THEIR STATUTORY LIMITS

The prosecution’s theory criminalized:

- Personal relationships,  
- Non-criminal conduct,  
- Workplace structure,  
- Celebrity lifestyle.

Federal courts have repeatedly rejected such expansions of RICO and §1591.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:

1. Vacate the RICO and sex‑trafficking convictions,  
2. Dismiss the indictment,  
3. Order immediate release, or  
4. Grant any other relief the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,  
  
Petitioner