Complaint Procedure Unit
Human Rights Council Branch
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
United Nations Office at Geneva
CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland

 

This petition is given under the General Assembly Resolution 53/144 of 8 March 1999, "Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" and Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 of 18 June 2007, “Institution-building of the United Nations Human Rights Council” on the “de facto” statelessness situation of the Myanmar minorities.

The Human Rights Council took many decisions on the situation of gross violations of human rights in Myanmar especially on the denationalization of the minorities. The Human Rights Council in the operative paragraph 5 of his resolution 34/22, dated 3 April 2017, with the title “Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar”, called upon the Government of Myanmar to review 1982 Citizenship Law as:

 

“Calls upon the Government of Myanmar to continue efforts to eliminate statelessness and the systematic and institutionalized discrimination against members of ethnic and religious minorities, including the root causes of discrimination, in particular relating to the Rohingya minority, inter alia by reviewing the 1982 Citizenship Law, which has led to deprival of human rights, by ensuring equal access to full citizenship through a transparent, voluntary and accessible procedure and to all civil and political rights, by allowing for self-identification, by amending or repealing all discriminatory legislation and policies, including discriminatory provisions of the set of “protection of race and religion laws” enacted in 2015 covering religious conversion, interfaith marriage, monogamy and population control, by lifting local orders restricting rights to freedom of movement and access to civil registration, health and education services and by improving the squalid living conditions within camps for internally displaced persons."

The statelessness of the minorities in Myanmar is originated from the implementation of the Article 3 of the Myanmar Citizenship Law 1982: a citizen in the Article 3 defined as:

“Nationals such as the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon, Rakhine or Shan
and ethnic groups as have settled in any of the territories included within the State as their permanent home from a period anterior to 1185 B.E., 1823 A.D. are Burma
citizens.”

The call upon the Government of Myanmar to review 1982 Citizenship Law by the Human Rights Council should be analyzed on whether Myanmar has any international obligations and responsibilities on citizenship or not.

We should ask whether the question of nationality falls within the domestic jurisdiction of Myanmar, as a right of sovereignty, defined in the Article 2.7 of the United Nations` Charter. If the answer to the question is “YES”, nationality falls within the domestic jurisdiction of Myanmar than the implementation of the Article 3 of the Myanmar Citizenship Law 1982 is lawful under the international law.

The answer to the question should be analyzed and answered in the light of the 1923 decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice on the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees on nationality that is on the development of international relations of Myanmar. The answer for the question will give the legal status of the statelessness problem of the Myanmar minorities whether they are now “de facto” or “de jura” stateless. If the stateless minorities are “de jura” stateless in the light of the 1923 decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice on nationality, then the world should accept them as “de jura” stateless under the definition of stateless as written in Article 1.1 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954 and the Human Rights Council`s call upon the Government of Myanmar to review 1982 Citizenship Law becomes null and void.

In its Advisory Opinion on the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees of 1923, the Permanent Court of International Justice on citizenship stated that whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends on the development of international relations of the State. The Permanent Court of International Justice said that while nationality issues were, in principle, within domestic jurisdiction, States must, nonetheless, honour their obligations to other States as governed by the rules of international law. Denationalization or arbitrary deprivation of nationality, which is against the
international treaties, and obligations of a State should not be recognized as lawful as stated by the Permanent Court of International Justice decision of 1923.

In the 1953 Report on the Elimination or Reduction of Statelessness, provided to the International Law Commission by Special Rapporteur Córdova, it was concluded that:

“It follows that international law sets forth the limits of the power of a State to confer its nationality. The power necessarily implies the right to deprive an individual of that nationality; consequently, international law may also restrict the authority of the State to deprive a person of its own nationality. There are cases in which international law considers that a certain national legislation is not legal because it comes into conflict with the broader interests of the international community. …

In the present state of international law, it is not, therefore, unwarranted to affirm that the right of individual States to legislate in matters of nationality is dependent upon and subordinate to the rules of international law on the subject, and that, therefore, these questions of nationality are not, as has been argued, entirely reserved for the exclusive jurisdiction of the individual States themselves.”

Myanmar was under the list of decolonization by the General Assembly Resolution 66 (I) namely, “Transmission of Information under Article 73 of the Charter” and gained his independence on 4 January 1948 by the implementation of the Article 73 of the United Nations` Charter. After gaining his independence, Myanmar applied on 27 February 1948 to the membership of the United Nations by a letter from the Ambassador U So Nyun. 

In the first paragraph of the letter, the ambassador of Burma (Myanmar) wrote that:

“By an Act passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom, Sovereignty over Burma passed from the British Crown to the Burmese people on 4th January, 1948, since when Burma has been a sovereign Independent Republic”

The Act passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom as written in the letter given by the Ambassador U Son Nyun, is the Burma Independence (A.D. 1947) Act to Provide for the independence of Burma.

The British parliament approved the Burma Independence Act on December 10, 1947.

In the Article 1.2 of the Burma Independence Act, the appointed independence day of Myanmar was written as 4 January 1948.

The Burma Independence Act is the appropriate legislation of the United Kingdom Parliament for the Independence of Myanmar as indicated in the Article 15 of the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of Burma, the Burma Independence Agreement (known as the Nu-Atlee Agreement) signed in London, on 17 October 1947.

In Article 15 of the Nu-Atlee Agreement, it is written that:

“The present Treaty shall be ratified and shall come into force immediately upon the exchange of Instruments of Ratification, which shall take place on the day on which Burma becomes independent in accordance with the appropriate legislation to be introduced in the United Kingdom for that purpose.”

The Nu-Atlee Agreement came into force on 4 January 1948, on the day of independence of Myanmar.

In Article 1 of the Nu-Atlee Agreement, the Government of the United Kingdom recognizes the Republic of the Union of Burma as a fully Independent Sovereign State. In the Article 3 of the Nu-Atlee Agreement, a citizen of Burma (Myanmar) defined:

“Any person who at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty is, by virtue of the Constitution of the Union of Burma, a citizen thereof and who is, or by virtue of a subsequent election is deemed to be, also a British subject, may make a declaration of alienage in the manner prescribed by the law of the Union, and thereupon shall cease to be a citizen of the Union. The Provisional Government of Burma undertake to introduce in the Parliament of the Union as early as possible, and in any case within a period of one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty, legislation for the purpose of implementing the provisions of this Article.”

The Nu-Atlee Agreement is an agreement of decolonization, in other words, State succession of Burma (Myanmar) from the British Empire. The effect of change of sovereignty upon the nationality of the inhabitants of the territory has a long history under the Customary International Law before the establishment of the United Nations. The territorial transfer is usually based on a treaty, and the agreement made between the ceding and cessionary State will, as a rule, include provisions concerning the nationality of the inhabitants of the ceded territory.

Special nationality provisions which have been included in almost all the Peace Treaties during and since the 19th century in the Peace Treaties of the past hundred years, a combination of the two principles of Domicile and Descent would appear to be the most- usual basis on which the problems of nationality were to be solved, and more especially during the course of the fifty years preceding the World War I.

In the absence of treaty provisions, physical presence on the territory, which is subject to the change of sovereignty, must be considered as the determining criterion. The last problem connected with territorial change is whether there is an obligation under international law to grant persons (to the inhabitants of the transferred territory) a right of option to retain their original nationality or to leave the transferred territory. Most of the treaties of cession and multilateral treaties dealing with the cession of territories (Peace Treaties) or questions arising from such cession contain provisions for the exercise of this right; it has, however, in some instances been limited to specific groups (national or religious minorities). Persons exercising the right to opt for their former nationality were, as a rule, compelled to leave the transferred territory.

The Inter-American Convention on Nationality signed at Montevideo on 26 December 1933 in Article 4 provides in case of the transfer of a portion of the territory on the part of one of the States signatory hereof to another of such States, the inhabitants of such transferred territory must not consider themselves as nationals of the State to which they are transferred, unless they
expressly opt to change their original nationality.

The Burma Independence Act, 1947 provided, inter alia, that a person who ceased to be a British subject under the Act and who upon independence neither became, nor became qualified to become, a citizen of the independent country of Burma had the right of election of its citizenship. In general, no minorities of Myanmar had the option to refuse the nationality of new on the date of decolonization.

In decolonization cases, British practice was to include the provisions, relating to the acquisition of the nationality of the new state, in their respective independence Act or Order itself. Such provisions are based upon the substantial connection between the person concerned and the territory of the new state. The option to refuse the nationality of the new state is rarely given to them. In this way, the British system succeeded to avoid the possibility of dual nationality and statelessness under the principle “leaving no one behind.”

The United Nations` Charter Article 2.7 is the Charter's reference to sovereignty. It stipulates that nothing in the Charter authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters, which are "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State." In the context of the United Nations` Charter, Article 2.7 has been regarded as embodying the principle of non-intervention. The relation between the concept of domestic jurisdiction and the non-intervention principle has been aptly described as:

“Clearly, domestic jurisdiction refers to the right of each state to freely—independent of other states and international organizations—exercise its own legislative, executive and judicial jurisdiction. Its exercise is consequence of state sovereignty and the rights of the nations to self-determinations.”

The key point is, whether an international responsibility for Myanmar which makes the citizenship problem out of the context of the Article 2.7 of the United Nations` Charter as written in the Resolution 2625 of the United Nations General Assembly which specifies the principle of State sovereignty by providing;

“Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international
obligations and to live in peace with other States.”

The first incident, which may be cited as a case in point of the General Assembly’s dealing with the plea of domestic jurisdiction, was the situation concerning Algeria (1955-1962). The debates on the Algerian case marked the beginning of the recognition by the General Assembly of the principle that no state could be the sole judge of its own cause. The Algerian case also affords a good illustration of the gradual consolidation of a new principle of contemporary international law, namely, the right to self-determination.

One of the questions on decolonization that the East Timor Case gives rise to is whether the right of peoples to self-determination is a norm of jus cogens or a peremptory norm of international law. The International Court of Justice's description for the right to self-determination as one of the “essential principles of contemporary international law” having an erga omnes character is profoundly significant because it appears to amount to its elevation as a norm of jus cogens. It should be observed that the notion of rights and obligations erga omnes and the concept of jus cogens are not identical, although they are inextricably linked. Saliently, it would appear that support for this view can be found in the dicta of the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction Case, in which the Court indicated that certain obligations deriving from, inter alia, “the principles and rules concerning basic rights of the human person including protection from slavery and racial discrimination” were obligations erga omnes, and hence forming part of the corpus of jus cogens norms. Opinion is divided but authority from most of the sources of international law exists supports the conclusion that self-determination is a norm of jus cogens.

The answer of the question, on the legality of the statelessness of the Myanmar minorities lay if the Nu-Atlee Agreement is an international agreement or not.

Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Matter of the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, between the Republic of Mauritius and the had given the same definition for the Lancaster House Undertakings as an international agreement. The Court noted that in paragraph 428 of his decision that:

“Had Mauritius remained part of the British Empire, the status of the 1965 Agreement would have remained a matter of British constitutional law. The independence of Mauritius in 1968, however, had the effect of elevating the package deal reached with the Mauritian Ministers to the international plane and of transforming the commitments made in 1965 into an international agreement.”

If by the Nu-Atlee Agreement, Myanmar remained part of the British Empire, the status of the Nu-Atlee Agreement would have remained a matter of British constitutional law. Upon the independence of Myanmar, the Nu-Atlee Agreement became a matter of international law between the Parties.

The Nu-Atlee Agreement is an international agreement under the United Nations` system of decolonization. This is the one of the key points, that makes the citizenship problem of the minorities in Myanmar out of the context of the Article 2.7 of the United Nations` Charter with a binding international agreement character.

The Nu-Atlee Agreement, in fact, other than being an international agreement but as an agreement made under the Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, carries the norm of jus cogens character, which makes the erga omnes responsibility to the international community as a whole.

The very object of the Nu-Atlee Agreement is the decolonization of the all peoples living in Burma (Myanmar) which cannot be sacrificed and left behind on the collective right of selfdetermination under the principle of uti possidetis.

The Nu-Atlee Agreement should also be analyzed accordingly to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties , which is a binding ratified treaty obligation for Myanmar.

The application of the Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties for the modification of the Nu-Atlee Agreement by the Myanmar Citizenship Law 1982 is invalid in two different senses. First, there needs an agreement between the parties for any kind of modification for the Nu-Atlee Agreement but as the Nu-Atlee  Agreement is an international agreement on decolonization, the modification should not be the breach of any jus cogens norms against the rights of the peoples of self-determination who gained their independence from colonial administration and became citizens of the new State. Secondly, the object and purpose of the Nu-Atlee Agreement are decolonizing all the peoples living in Burma (Myanmar) and make them citizens of the newly independent State. When the minorities, who had gained their citizenship by using their right to self-determination by the Nu–Atlee Agreement, lost their citizenship and become stateless because of the implementation of the modification of the Nu-Atlee Agreement by the Article 3 of the Myanmar Citizenship Law 1982, this is against the “object and purposes” of the Nu-Atlee Agreement and its ordinary meaning which can never be sacrificed. Even the approval of the United Kingdom for this kind of a modification which may cause the statelessness of the decolonized peoples could not be accepted as legal and valid
by not only the United Nations but the international community as a whole. And even, the United Nations Security Council does not have any authority of any kind for the modification that can cause statelessness of the peoples who gained their citizenship by the implementation of the Article 73 of the United Nations` Charter.

Part V, Articles 42 to 45 and 54 to 64, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties set out the various circumstances in which a treaty can be denounced, terminated, or its operation suspended, other than on the ground of invalidity, which ground is very rarely invoked, and even more rarely successfully, no right to withdraw; in other words, the withdrawal provision was intended or agreed to by all of the signatories which is not a case for the United Kingdom and Myanmar. Articles 65 to 72, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties specify the procedures to be followed and the consequences of termination or suspension with the object of limiting the grounds for invalidity, termination, or suspension of treaties to those that are exclusively recognized by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and, as far as termination or suspension of treaties goes to the possible grounds foreseen by a treaty itself. 

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties indicated by Article 46 provides that internal law may not be invoked to rely on its internal law for the purpose of escaping its international obligations, which is restated in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties but the latter rule only applies if the international obligation is legally valid. The Article 3 of the Myanmar Citizenship law 1982 is a serious breach of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law, jus cogens norm of self-determination right of the minorities of Myanmar to the international community as a whole. The international community has an
obligation of non-recognition of an unlawful statelessness situation of the Myanmar minorities created by the implementation of the Article 3 of the Myanmar Citizenship Law.

Under treaty law or, as stated in Article 53, “for the purposes of the present Convention”, conflict with a jus cogens norm or peremptory law is a ground for voidance of a treaty. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties applies to the specific circumstance in which a treaty conflicts, at the time of its conclusion, with pre-existing jus cogens rule. It does not extend to circumstances in which a treaty conflicts with a rule that has arisen since its conclusion; the latter scenario is covered by Article 64 of the Convention, the commentary to which add support to the developments se tout infra, in particular as regards the specific
circumstances in which the jus cogens supervenience principle applies.

According to Article 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it is written, that “if a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.” The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 2 provides that the validity of a treaty may be impeached “only through the application of the present Convention.” The basic limitation in the effective enforcement of jus cogens norms in the regime of the law of treaties is that this ground of invalidity may be invoked only by the parties to the convention.”

To determine the correct application of the non-retroactive rule under Article 4 in relation to Article 64, the relevant issue is not whether the treaty in question was concluded before or after the convention`s entry into force, but from the point of time after the convention’s entry into force a jus cogens norm should invalidate that treaty. On the basis of the nature of the jus cogens rule in Article 64, the more precise non-retroactivity rule applicable is not Article 4, but paragraph 2(b) of Article 71, which provides, inter alia, that the termination of a treaty under Article 64 “does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created by the execution of the treaty prior to its termination.”

The concept of Article 53 and 64 is based on the concept “no derogation shall be permitted to a norm accepted and recognized by international community of States as whole as norm from which no derogations is permitted”, and the Nu-Atlee Agreement is an international agreement of a jus cogens character and articles of this agreement cannot be changed which are against the object and purposes the agreement and sacrifices the agreement. The non-retroactive rule under Article 4 is not an issue on the responsibility to protect the jus cogens norms of the Nu-Atlee 
Agreement from any kind of derogation.

The modification/termination of Article 3 of the Nu-Atlee Agreement constitutes a breach of international law and must be defined by the international community as the internationally wrongful act of Myanmar under the doctrine of state responsibility. As mentioned above the jus cogens character of the Nu-Atlee Agreement gives erga omnes responsibility to the international community.

The International Court of Justice in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory case, asked the question of the action is required to bring to an end by the United Nations on a breach of an erga omnes norm of self-determination and reminded that international community is under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting.

The obligations in Article 41 of the International Law Commission Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts rest on the assumption of international solidarity an understanding that a collective response by all States is necessary to counteract the effects of such a violation. The obligation of non-recognition of an unlawful situation is set out in Article 41.2 of Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.

The function of non-recognition is to prevent validation of an act or its consequences, which are already legally void. This obligation is linked with the maxim ex-injuria jus non oritur requiring that acts contrary to international law shall not become sources of legal rights for the violator and is, therefore, primarily directed against “poisoned fruits”(results) of the illegal conduct. The reason is that validation of these consequences through recognition may seriously undermine fundamental norm on which the illegality of an act is based, which may, in turn,
threaten the whole international legal order. If the consequences of an illegal conduct are recognized by a substantial number of states, it would become very difficult to claim that the breached fundamental norm has not been replaced or modified at least with regard to recognizing states. Article 48 of Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts deals with the invocation of responsibility by states other than the injured state acting in the collective interest. A state that is entitled to invoke responsibility under Article 48 is acting not in its individual capacity by reason of having suffered injury, but in its capacity as
a member of a group of states to which the obligation is owed, or indeed as a member of the international community as a whole. In practice, it is most likely that this collective response will be coordinated through the competent organs of the United Nations as well.

The United Kingdom is primarily responsible for the internationally wrongful act of Myanmar on the modification/termination of the citizenship article of the Nu-Atlee Agreement as the party to the agreement and should act with his responsibility as codified in Article 14 of the agreement. In Article 14, it is written that:

“Should any difference arise relative to the application or the interpretation of the
present Treaty, and should the contracting parties fail to settle such difference by direct negotiations, the difference shall be deferred to the International Court of Justice unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.”

The United Kingdom should begin to negotiate on full implementation of the Article 3 of the Nu-Atlee Agreement. The United Kingdom if cannot solve the dispute of the full implementation of the Article 3 of the Nu-Atlee Agreement than shall defer the validity of the Article 3 of the Agreement to the International Court of Justice for a binding decision. The United Kingdom shall take the necessary steps on the non-recognition of the statelessness resulting from the Myanmar Citizenship Law 1982 and shall ask the international community on the obligation of the non-recognition of the “de facto” statelessness of the Myanmar minorities as the consequence of the implementation of the Article 3 of the Myanmar Citizenship Law 1982. This is an obligation for the United Kingdom under the principle of pacta sunt servanda and good faith under international law for the Nu-Atlee Agreement. The United Nations has the same responsibility as the United Kingdom for the Nu-Atlee Agreement.

The International Court of Justice affirmed in the Reparation for Injuries case that the United Nations “is a subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties … It has the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.” In paragraph 160 of the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory case, the International Court of Justice reminded the responsibility of the United Nations to bring to an end the illegal situation created by the wall as:

“Finally, the Court is of the view that the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated régime, taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion.”

In its General Comment No. 12, the Human Rights Committee has added that“[t]he obligations exist irrespective of whether a people entitled to self-determination depends on a State party to the Covenant or not. It follows that all States parties to the Covenant should take positive action to facilitate the realization of and respect for the right of peoples to self-determination”. Following from that, one can explain the “erga omnes illegality” of South Africa’s presence in Namibia as the resultant of a violation of the right of self-determination of the people of Namibia, which was opposable erga omnes. The violation of the subjective rights of the people of Namibia was explicitly recognized by the International Court of Justice where it held that “[…] all States should bear in mind that the injured entity is a people which must look to the international community for assistance in its progress towards the goals for which the sacred trust was in”.

When the Nu-Atlee Agreement decolonized Burma (Myanmar), the option to refuse the nationality for the new state and chose another nationality had not been given to the minorities of Burma (Myanmar). Before the independence of Myanmar, all the peoples including the minorities were under the protection of the Article 73 of the United Nations` Charter by the General Assembly Resolution 66 (I). In Article 73, the interests of the inhabitants of the territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government as a principle defined as “paramount”, this principle includes “the well-being of them.” When the minorities of Burma (Myanmar) became stateless by decolonization, this is against the “object and purposes” of the Article 73 of the United Nations` Charter that can never be “sacrificed.

Decolonization is based on the principle, “leaving no one behind” for the right of the peoples to self-determination. The United Nations and the international community as a whole under the erga omnes responsibility for the protection of the Nu-Atlee Agreement on the base that “no derogation shall be allowed from the right of the peoples to self-determination.

In the operative paragraphs of the mandate of the Human Rights Council in the General Assembly Resolution 60/251, in Article 2, it is specified that “the Council shall be responsible for promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind and in a fair and equal manner”; in Article 3, gives responsibility for the decisions of the Human Rights Council within the United Nations system as “the Council should address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations, and make recommendations thereon. It should also promote the effective coordination and the mainstreaming of human rights within the United Nations`system;”, and in the Article 4, principles of the Human Rights Council is codified as “the work of the Council shall be guided by the principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, constructive international dialogue and cooperation, with a view to enhancing the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development.” In the operative Article 5 (i), the Human Rights Council is authorized to “make recommendations with regard to the promotion and protection of human rights” to the General Assembly.

As the main body of the human rights protection in the United Nations` System, the Human Rights Council should go on further action for the Nu-Atlee Agreement as the agreement itself is under the Principles and the Purposes of the United Nations` Charter in the sense of Article 73 of the United Nations` Charter on decolonization and the Human Rights Council has the responsibility to follow up that no derogation shall be permitted to a norm accepted and recognized by international community of States as whole as norm from which no derogations is permitted for the Nu-Atlee Agreement as written in the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory case.

In the light of the 1923 decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice on the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees on nationality, the Human Rights Council instead of using the wording “call upon“ in the operative paragraph 5 of his resolution 34/22, dated 3 April 2017, with the title “Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar”, should remind Myanmar that citizenship rights of the minorities are not under the domestic jurisdiction of the State and Myanmar has an responsibility to act in pacta sunt servanda and good faith for his responsibilities originated from the Nu–Atlee Agreement and demand Myanmar to nullify the 1982 Citizenship Article 3 and the consequences for the implementation of the article as Article 3 of the Myanmar Citizenship Law is under the definition of the Internationally Wrongful Act of Myanmar.

The Human Rights Council should as well ask the General Assembly of the United Nations for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice within his mandate as written in the operative paragraph 5 (i) in accordance with Article 65 of the Statute of the Court, by referring Article 14 of the Nu-Atlee Agreement as the legal background of his application as the concept that the agreement is originated from the article 73 of the United Nations` Charter, signifies the reality that the United Kingdom had signed the agreement in the name of the United Nations on the following questions:

(a) Binding character of the Nu-Atlee Agreement for Myanmar including Article 3 on citizenship,

(b) The obligation of non-recognition, the consequences of the implementation of Article 3 of the Myanmar Citizenship Law 1982 as legal, for the “de facto” statelessness of the minorities of Myanmar by the international community as a whole.

If the Human Rights Council does not fulfill his responsibility to act for the statelessness of the minorities in Myanmar, such a non-action unfortunately will be under the definition of the “International Responsibility of an International Organization for an Internationally Wrongful Act.