PETITON FOR REMOVAL OF A PUBLIC OFFICIAL
COMES NOW, the State of Texas, by and through Relators, Lisa Broomfield and Steven Broomfield, and files this Petition for Removal of a Public Official, seeking the removal of Eric Scott “Rick” McPherson from his office as Judge of the County Court at Law of Panola County. This action is brought pursuant to Chapter 87 of the Texas Local Government Code. In support thereof, the State and Relators would respectfully show the Court the following:
I. PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
1. Relators, Lisa Broomfield and Steven Broomfield, are residents of the State of Texas. At all times relevant to the grounds for removal alleged herein, Relators resided in Panola County, Texas, for more than six months and are not under indictment in said county. Relators are therefore qualified to bring this action under Section 87.015 of the Texas Local Government Code.
2. Respondent, Eric Scott “Rick” McPherson, is the duly elected and serving Judge of the County Court at Law of Panola County, Texas, and is a county officer subject to removal under Texas Local Government Code § 87.012. He may be served with process at his chambers at the Panola County Courthouse, 110 S. Sycamore St., #201, Carthage, Texas 75633.
3. This Court has jurisdiction over this cause pursuant to Article V, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution and Texas Local Government Code § 87.015(a). Venue is proper in Panola County as it is the county where Respondent serves in his official capacity and where all or a substantial part of the events giving rise to this cause occurred.
II. GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL
4. This petition is brought to remove Respondent Eric Scott “Rick” McPherson from his office as Judge of the County Court at Law for incompetency and/or official misconduct, as defined by Texas Local Government Code § 87.011 and authorized by § 87.013.
5. “Incompetency” is defined as “gross ignorance of official duties” or “unfitness to discharge properly the duties of office.” § 87.011(2). “Official misconduct” includes an “intentional failure of an officer to perform a duty that is required of the officer by law.” § 87.011(3).
A. Unlawful Failure to Disqualify Constituting Incompetency and Official Misconduct
6. While employed as an Assistant District Attorney for Panola County, Respondent McPherson had personal knowledge and prosecutorial involvement in criminal cases against Carly Asher Jones and her common law husband, Brandon Bounds, Sr. (Exhibit A)
7. After his election as Judge of the County Court at Law, on or about April 13, 2023, Respondent McPherson presided over and signed the dismissal orders for two separate felony indictments pending against the very same Carly Asher Jones for the very same cases he participated in while in the DA’s office. (Exhibit B)
8. Subsequently, Respondent McPherson presided over a related civil custody case, In the Interest of BBJ, a Child, Cause No. 2020-095, involving Ms. Jones and the Relators. He again failed to recuse himself or disclose his prior prosecutorial involvement and conflict of interest, thereby depriving the Relators of their constitutional right to an impartial tribunal. Article V, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution commands that “[n]o judge shall sit in any case … wherein he shall have been counsel in the case.” This constitutional mandate is codified in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b(a)(2), which states that a judge “must disqualify” if he has “served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy.” This disqualification was automatic and mandatory, with the onus on Respondent McPherson to act without requiring intervention from any party. Unlike grounds for recusal, which can be discretionary and may be waived, constitutional disqualification is a structural defect that cannot be cured by the parties’ consent or waiver. It is absolute. His failure to adhere to this fundamental, non-waivable command demonstrates either gross ignorance of his judicial duties, constituting incompetency, or a willful disregard for the law, constituting official misconduct.
9. Judge McPherson’s service as the prosecuting attorney against Carly Asher Jones in felony cases placed him squarely within the definition of having “served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy.”
10. Respondent’s actions and omissions constitute a willful and persistent failure to follow the law, demonstrating a pattern of conduct that renders him unfit to hold judicial office.
B. Official Misconduct Arising from Concealment of District Attorney’s Incapacity
11. Furthermore, on information and belief, during the period from 2023 until the end of District Attorney Danny Buck Davidson’s term, Respondent McPherson, while serving as an Assistant District Attorney, was aware that Mr. Davidson was suffering from a severe cognitive incapacity that rendered him unable to perform his official duties. Respondent McPherson participated in concealing this incapacity from the public and the courts while allowing the District Attorney’s Office to continue operating under Mr. Davidson’s name, constituting intentional, unlawful behavior relating to his duties as a Texas lawyer in violation of Rule 8.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct – Reporting Professional Misconduct, which states: (a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has violated the rules in a way that raises a substantial question about their honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness must report it to the appropriate disciplinary authority.
12. This duty to report is not optional; it is fundamental to maintaining the integrity of the legal profession. As an attorney at the time, Respondent McPherson was bound by these rules. This past professional misconduct, demonstrating a disregard for his ethical duties, is evidence of his lack of integrity and current fitness to serve in a judicial capacity.
13. Upon information and belief, District Attorney Davidson was suffering from a severe cognitive impairment to the extent that he was unable to perform his duties. This incapacity was widely known among county officials, including Respondent McPherson, who was aware that the District Attorney was functionally incapacitated and required constant monitoring. Respondent McPherson had actual knowledge of the DA’s incapacity and had a mandatory duty under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct to report it, yet he failed to do so. This purposeful failure to uphold his ethical obligations as an officer of the court is further evidence of his unfitness to hold judicial office.