We, the undersigned residents, taxpayers, business owners, and community members of Cambridge, Ohio, respectfully petition the Cambridge City Council to terminate the City's use of Flock Safety automated license plate reader cameras and remove all Flock Safety equipment operating within the City's jurisdiction.

We recognize and respect the responsibility of the Cambridge Police Department and other public safety agencies to protect our community and investigate crime. We also recognize that technology can be a useful tool for law enforcement. However, public safety must be balanced with the fundamental rights to privacy, freedom of movement, due process, and protection from unnecessary government surveillance.

We believe Flock Safety's automated license plate reader system crosses that line.

I. FLOCK CAMERAS CREATE A SYSTEM OF MASS LOCATION SURVEILLANCE

Flock cameras do not merely photograph vehicles suspected of committing crimes. They can record passing vehicles and their characteristics, creating searchable information about where vehicles were observed.

That distinction matters.

A person should not have to be suspected of a crime for the government to accumulate information about their movements throughout their own community.

A resident going to work, visiting a family member, attending a religious service, visiting a medical provider, attending a political demonstration, going to school, shopping, or simply driving through town should not automatically become part of a searchable surveillance database.

The question before Council should therefore not simply be:

"Can these cameras help solve crimes?"

Almost any surveillance technology can potentially help solve a crime.

The more important question is:

"Is creating a permanent or semi-permanent record of ordinary people's movements a reasonable price for the additional investigative capability these cameras provide?"

We believe the answer is no.

II. CAMBRIDGE RESIDENTS SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO A NATIONWIDE SURVEILLANCE NETWORK

Flock's technology does not necessarily operate as an isolated Cambridge system.

The ACLU of Ohio has raised concerns that Flock's network can allow data collected by one municipality to become accessible to other agencies through nationwide data-sharing arrangements. In testimony concerning Cleveland's Flock contract, the ACLU of Ohio specifically warned that local cameras can become part of a much larger surveillance network rather than remaining solely under the control of the community that purchased them.

This creates an important democratic problem.

A Cambridge resident who has never been suspected of a crime should not have their vehicle information potentially accessible to agencies hundreds or thousands of miles away simply because Cambridge purchased a product from a private surveillance company.

Cambridge residents elect Cambridge officials.

They do not elect every police department, federal agency, or government entity that might potentially gain access to information collected in Cambridge.

III. THE POTENTIAL FOR MISSION CREEP IS TOO GREAT

Surveillance technologies frequently begin with a narrow purpose and gradually expand.

A system initially described as a tool for locating stolen vehicles can eventually become useful for identifying vehicles associated with demonstrations, political activity, particular neighborhoods, people visiting particular locations, or individuals who have never been accused of wrongdoing.

Once the infrastructure exists, expanding its use becomes considerably easier.

The City Council therefore has an opportunity to prevent mission creep before it becomes normalized.

The appropriate standard should be:

If the City would not approve a new surveillance purpose through a transparent public process, that purpose should not be accomplished simply through an existing camera network.

IV. WARRANTLESS ACCESS RAISES SERIOUS CIVIL LIBERTIES CONCERNS

The ability to determine where a vehicle has been observed can reveal extraordinarily personal information about an individual's life.

Repeated observations can potentially establish patterns concerning:

Where someone lives
Where they work
Where they regularly visit
Who they associate with
Which organizations or events they attend
Which medical facilities they visit
Which religious institutions they visit
Which political or community events they attend
Even if a system does not use facial recognition, the ability to associate a vehicle with repeated locations can provide a powerful form of indirect identification.

The ACLU of Ohio has specifically criticized the absence of sufficiently strong legal safeguards governing ALPR surveillance in Ohio and has called for meaningful restrictions on how this information can be collected, retained, searched, and shared.

Cambridge should not wait for a statewide law or court decision before protecting its residents.

V. DATA SECURITY IS A PUBLIC SAFETY ISSUE

Every database containing sensitive information creates another potential target for unauthorized access, misuse, or breach.

A database containing information about where vehicles have been observed is not harmless simply because it does not contain a person's name.

If information can be used to reconstruct a person's movements, that information deserves the same seriousness we would give any other sensitive government record.

Cambridge should not outsource control over sensitive information concerning its residents' movements to a private corporation unless the City can demonstrate that the benefits substantially outweigh the risks.

VI. PRIVATE CORPORATIONS SHOULD NOT BECOME THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE

Flock Safety is a private company selling surveillance technology to government agencies.

That creates a fundamental accountability concern.

Residents cannot vote out Flock Safety.

They cannot directly compel Flock to change its business practices.

They cannot meaningfully participate in Flock's corporate decision-making.

Yet the company can provide the infrastructure through which government surveillance occurs.

The responsibility for protecting Cambridge residents' constitutional and civil liberties ultimately belongs to the elected officials of Cambridge, not to a private technology vendor's assurances about how its product is intended to be used.

VII. "WE ONLY USE IT TO SOLVE CRIMES" IS NOT A SUFFICIENT SAFEGUARD

We recognize that law enforcement may have legitimate investigative reasons to search vehicle information.

However, the existence of legitimate uses does not eliminate the possibility of abuse.

The appropriate question is not whether every officer will misuse the system.

The appropriate question is whether Cambridge should maintain a surveillance system capable of misuse in the first place.

Strong public policy does not depend upon assuming that every individual with access to government information will always make the correct decision.

Strong public policy establishes limits before misuse occurs.

VIII. FALSE IDENTIFICATION AND INVESTIGATIVE ERRORS ARE SERIOUS CONCERNS

Automated systems are not infallible.

A vehicle may be incorrectly associated with a plate, location, vehicle characteristic, or investigative alert.

Even when an automated system is technically functioning as designed, an officer may interpret an alert incorrectly or give it more weight than it deserves.

A technology intended to assist an investigation should never become a substitute for probable cause, human judgment, or traditional investigative standards.

The risk becomes particularly concerning when the information concerns innocent people who have simply driven past a camera.

IX. SURVEILLANCE CAN DISCOURAGE LAWFUL CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITY

People behave differently when they believe they are being watched.

That can have consequences for free speech, political participation, religious activity, journalism, protest, and community organizing.

Residents should not have to wonder whether attending a lawful demonstration, political gathering, community meeting, or other event will result in their vehicle being recorded and potentially searchable later.

The government should encourage residents to participate in civic life, not create infrastructure that makes them wonder whether participation is being documented.

X. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER NON-LOCAL USES DESERVE PARTICULAR SCRUTINY

Across the country, communities have raised concerns about ALPR information being accessed by agencies for purposes unrelated to the local circumstances that originally justified installation of the cameras.

The ACLU has specifically documented concerns regarding Flock's data-sharing relationships and access by federal immigration authorities.

Cambridge residents should not have to rely on assumptions about how their information might be used.

If the City cannot guarantee that information collected in Cambridge will remain exclusively under strict local control and will never be provided for purposes unrelated to legitimate local criminal investigations, then the system should not operate.

XI. DATA RETENTION SHOULD NOT BECOME AN UNLIMITED HISTORY OF OUR MOVEMENTS

The longer information is retained, the more valuable and revealing the database becomes.

A single observation may tell very little.

Thousands of observations over time can tell an entirely different story.

This creates an incentive for government agencies and private companies to retain information because it might become useful someday.

That is precisely the mindset that should be rejected.

The government should collect the minimum information necessary for a clearly defined purpose and retain it for the minimum amount of time necessary.

If Cambridge cannot establish a compelling reason to retain information about an innocent person's vehicle, that information should not be retained.

XII. THE CITY SHOULD NOT NORMALIZE SURVEILLANCE WITHOUT MEANINGFUL PUBLIC CONSENT

The installation of surveillance infrastructure affects every resident, not merely the people who interact with law enforcement.

That makes this fundamentally a community policy decision.

Residents deserve meaningful transparency regarding:

How many cameras operate in Cambridge
Where every camera is located
What information each camera collects
How long information is retained
Who can access the information
Which outside agencies can access it
How frequently outside agencies access it
Whether federal agencies can access it
What search terms and investigative purposes are permitted
Whether searches require a warrant or other legal process
How misuse is investigated
What penalties exist for misuse
How much the system costs taxpayers
What happens to the data if the City's contract ends
If the City cannot answer these questions clearly and publicly, it should not continue operating the system.

XIII. OTHER COMMUNITIES ARE RECONSIDERING FLOCK

Cambridge would not be acting alone.

Communities across the country have begun canceling or reconsidering Flock contracts because of concerns surrounding privacy, surveillance, data sharing, and accountability. Recent reporting indicates that dozens of municipalities have rejected or canceled Flock agreements during 2026.

Cambridge should be willing to reconsider a technology when credible concerns emerge.

Changing course is not an admission that the original decision was made in bad faith.

It is responsible government.

XIV. PUBLIC SAFETY AND PRIVACY ARE NOT OPPOSING VALUES

We reject the idea that residents must choose between public safety and civil liberties.

Cambridge can support its police department while also establishing boundaries around surveillance.

Cambridge can investigate serious crimes without creating a searchable record of every vehicle traveling through the city.

Cambridge can invest in proven investigative resources, additional personnel, community policing, emergency response, victim services, and other public safety measures that do not require the routine monitoring of innocent residents.

The goal should be effective policing without unnecessary surveillance.

OUR REQUEST

Therefore, we respectfully request that Cambridge City Council:

Terminate the City's Flock Safety contract at the earliest legally permissible opportunity.
Deactivate and remove all Flock Safety automated license plate reader cameras located within the City of Cambridge.
Prohibit the installation of additional Flock Safety cameras or other ALPR systems unless specifically approved through a transparent public process.
Conduct a complete audit of all information collected through the City's Flock system.
Publicly disclose the City's current Flock contract, policies, data-retention requirements, camera locations, costs, and data-sharing arrangements, subject to legally required redactions.
Disclose which outside law enforcement agencies or governmental entities have accessed information collected by Cambridge's cameras.
Determine whether Cambridge's data has been accessed for federal immigration enforcement, protest monitoring, intelligence gathering, or purposes unrelated to legitimate local criminal investigations.
Require the deletion of information concerning innocent residents when there is no legitimate and legally authorized reason for its continued retention.
Hold a public hearing before entering into any future contract for automated license plate readers or comparable mass-surveillance technology.
Prioritize public safety strategies that respect the privacy and constitutional rights of Cambridge residents.
CONCLUSION

Cambridge is a community, not a surveillance zone.

Residents should be able to drive through their own city without creating a government-accessible record of their movements simply because they happened to pass a camera.

We believe public safety is strongest when residents trust their government and their law enforcement agencies.

That trust requires transparency, accountability, restraint, and respect for individual liberty.

We therefore respectfully ask the Cambridge City Council to remove Flock Safety cameras from Cambridge, terminate the City's relationship with Flock Safety, and establish clear limits preventing the expansion of mass vehicle surveillance within our community.

We urge the Council to listen to its residents, examine the evidence, and choose a public safety strategy that protects both the security of our community and the freedom of the people who live here.