When people in Iran take to the streets in peaceful protests to demand basic rights, dignity, and freedom, the Islamic Republic has repeatedly responded with extreme and lethal violence.

During multiple nationwide uprisings, Iranian security forces fired live ammunition at unarmed civilians, killing thousands of people in the streets, according to extensive eyewitness testimony, survivor accounts, and human rights reporting. These killings were not random or isolated events — they were systematically accompanied by deliberate nationwide internet and telecommunications shutdowns.

These blackouts were intentional tools of repression.

By cutting internet access, mobile data, phone calls, and even SMS services, the regime:

• Prevented protesters from coordinating or escaping danger
• Blocked families from locating detained or killed loved ones
• Stopped victims from documenting killings in real time
• Suppressed global awareness while mass violence was unfolding

In practice, the Islamic Republic used internet shutdowns to enable and conceal mass killings, allowing security forces to act with impunity while the population was silenced.

At the same time, while the people of Iran were completely cut off—even from one another—state-controlled and regime-affiliated media outlets remained fully active online. Their websites stayed accessible, their social media accounts continued posting, and their content appeared prominently in global search results.

This created a deadly information imbalance:

• Citizens were silenced
• The regime’s propaganda machine stayed online

After the killings, these same outlets were used to deny responsibility, blame victims, and spread disinformation—rewriting events that could not be independently verified because evidence had been suppressed during the blackout.

The United States has long presented itself as a defender of free expression, human rights, and accountability for mass atrocities. Existing U.S. sanctions already restrict dealings with many Iranian state entities, including those linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and state propaganda apparatuses.

Allowing sanctioned or regime-controlled media infrastructure to operate freely—especially during and after internet shutdowns—directly undermines those principles and enables authoritarian information warfare.

 

We, U.S. Citizens and supporters of human rights, urgently call for the following actions:

1) Action by Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
We request that OFAC and the DOJ:

Review and assess a documented list of Iranian state-controlled and IRGC-affiliated media outlets and propaganda networks, which will be published and publicly linked at the end of this petition.
Identify websites, domain names, hosting services, and digital infrastructure operated by or materially supporting sanctioned Iranian entities, including outlets using global top-level domains (.com, .net, .org, etc.) as well as country-code domains (.ir).
Take all actions permitted under U.S. law, including sanctions enforcement, seizure, blocking, or restriction of domains and related infrastructure where legal thresholds are met.
Formally notify and require compliance from U.S.-based technology companies and service providers when sanctioned or regime-controlled entities are found to be using their platforms or infrastructure unlawfully.
This includes media outlets already designated or sanctioned whose domains may be inactive but whose content, archives, or links continue to circulate through U.S.-based services.

 
2) Directed requests from U.S. authorities to technology and platform companies
We specifically ask OFAC and/or the DOJ, within their respective authorities, to formally request and require compliance from:

Google
X
Meta
These requests should require the companies to:

De-index and remove from search results all websites operated by, controlled by, or materially supporting sanctioned Iranian regime media, including:

State propaganda outlets
IRGC-affiliated news agencies
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)
Previously blocked outlets whose domains or archives still appear in search results
Apply de-indexing across all domains, including .com, .net, .org, .ir, mirror domains, and successor domains.
Suspend or disable social media accounts operated by or materially supporting sanctioned or regime-controlled media entities.
Restrict monetization, amplification, and algorithmic promotion of any remaining state-affiliated content where full removal is not legally mandated.
 
3) Independent action by technology and social media companies
In addition to government-directed enforcement, we call on Google, X, Meta, and other technology platforms to act independently under their own terms of service and policies by:

Reviewing the linked list of Iranian state and IRGC-controlled media outlets and their associated domains and accounts.
Proactively de-indexing, suspending, or removing accounts and websites involved in state propaganda, disinformation, or material support for violent repression.
Treating nationwide internet shutdowns in Iran as high-risk indicators of mass human rights violations, requiring expedited review and response.
 
4) Reference to documented list
A separate, publicly accessible list:

 
This call to action is not about censorship.
It is about lawful enforcement, sanctions compliance, and preventing a violent authoritarian regime from abusing open platforms while its people are silenced and killed.