Commit to 3%! 

The UK faces many threats to its national security, economy, and democracy. Revisionist powers threaten and attack our allies and friends. Yet, if we are honest, our depleted armed forces are not fit for the task of defending the nation from such a confrontation if it were to escalate. The peace dividend has been spent, and we now need a quantum increase in our national security commitment to deter future enemies.

The Commit to 3% campaign encourages supporters to get all our political leaders and their parties to commit to a step-change increase in military and security spending over the next three years. We must rethink our national security and move urgently to spend more, now.

We come from all political parties and none, and we boast no ideology except that a democracy that cannot defend itself is a democracy living on borrowed time.  That needs to change, and the best form of defence is deterrence. And again, if we are honest, currently, apart from our nuclear deterrence – which we are too reliant on – we offer no real, substantive deterrence to aggressors whose bellicose actions might lead to significant regional or even world war. Money spent now will save lives and stop revisionist powers from threatening us.

These issues are too important to be the exclusive purview of generals and think tankers. They need to be the focus of day-to-day politics, of real manifesto commitments.

1.            Commit to spending 3% of GDP per annum on defence and security by the end of 2027, i.e., in the next three years. We must move urgently; the ramp-up required to defend ourselves properly will take time, money, and commitment. While welcome, the recent 2.5% commitment is insufficient and will take too long (until 2029). We need to move quickly and at scale.

2.            This 3% should NOT include spending on our nuclear deterrence, which the Treasury should separately fund  - it's worth noting that this is what happened before 2010. Currently, we spend 2.3% of the planned budget on the military, which includes more than 0.5% of GDP on nuclear deterrence. According to some estimates, the actual non-nuclear element of military spending amounts to 1.75% of GDP once defence pensions are also excluded.

3.            There should be an open debate about how the extra money is spent, possibly including a Royal Commission backed up by a formal National Security review. However, the additional spending on pay for troops must be a top priority to hit putative recruitment targets.

4.            The UK government should encourage all other NATO countries to commit to a 3% target within five years. NATO’s strength is most significant when all its members commit to adequately funding defence.

5.           Any commitment to increase spending on national security needs to be properly planned and costed. Aspirational targets without firm funding plans won’t do. The urgent change requires a proper plan, with clear commitments to raising taxes, cutting spending, or both.  Defence priorities need to be at the top of the list.

FAQ?

Why focus on a % target – surely there should be more focus on spending the existing budget more efficiently. No one disputes apparent inefficiencies in current procurement programmes, and focusing on targets is not an either/or approach.

Procurement needs to be more efficient. But we cannot escape the reality that extra troops, equipment, and munitions will cost more money. As for a 3% target, this echoes the existing NATO target/guideline to get to 2% of GDP spending – and ups the ante. A uniform GDP target spend for all member states incentivises equitable investment that considers respective spending power across economies of varying sizes.

Is the recently suggested commitment to increase defence spending to 2.5% ‘enough’?

Any increase is welcomed, but for perspective, consider that in the 1960s and 1970s, defence spending as a percentage of GDP was in a range well above 4% and peaked at 5.5% in 1984. The ratio only fell below 4% in the early 1990s. This coincided with the fall of the Soviet Union. If it was felt that the Cold War was severe enough to justify the ratio being above 4%, why is this time different, especially when we have a revisionist power that has invaded a country and threatened others with nuclear and non-nuclear weapons?

Isn’t a 3% commitment too expensive? In concrete, practical terms, a commitment to get to 3% using current numbers (which many, especially in the USA, think is the bare minimum for effective deterrence) would involve spending an extra circa £20 to £30 billion each year.

You say that the 3% target should exclude nuclear deterrence – why? There are solid arguments for nuclear deterrence, and many argue it is essential. But their use is limited to extreme situations, particularly when a fail-safe, last-chance national ‘insurance’ policy is required. Because we would almost certainly only ever use it well into a protracted conflict, its use for most strategic and certainly tactical situations is minimal.

There is also the issue that the current programme is running wildly over budget – as many procurement programmes are – sucking valuable resources out of the front line. It would be better to regard the nuclear deterrence as a direct insurance policy outside the broader defence programme.

The nuclear deterrent is the essential last change ‘insurance’ policy that underwrites the UK’s and NATO’s collective security. However, it is a tool of diplomacy rather than conflict, and its very deployment would signal the moment deterrence failed. It is not an alternative to properly funded, manned and equipped armed forces, which provide a critical parallel pillar of deterrence, ensuring that the UK has the means to defend its interests from aggression and be seen by potential belligerents to be able to do so.

The purpose of NATO spending targets is to ensure that member states contribute equitably to this collective obligation. Given the cost and complexity of renewing the nuclear deterrent, the UK’s ability to do this should not be compromised by equating the budget of the former with the latter. Otherwise, a zero-sum game could emerge, leaving the UK and NATO vulnerable.

You decline to say what the extra money should be spent on – why? Determining the exact makeup of the UK’s armed forces is rightly the responsibility of politicians, senior military officials and the wider expert defence community. Whatever the budget afforded to defence and security, this will require complex decisions regarding the optimal level of manning, which capabilities to invest in, and how much to procure. Necessarily classified threat assessments will guide these decisions. However, our responsibility is to ensure that the political will exists and endures to guarantee that our national security is adequately resourced.

You suggest the establishment of an independent Royal Commission to review our military capabilities – why? National security is too important to play politics with; it must be the first duty of any government – no matter its political makeup – to ensure that the UK and its interests are adequately defended. Decisions taken or not taken today will reverberate over decades and multiple parliaments. A non-partisan Royal Commission would ensure cross-party consensus and commitment to delivery, which in itself will reinforce the credibility of the UK’s enduring deterrence among potential aggressors and adversaries.