November 21, 2025

Dutchtown Community Improvement District Board of Directors:

Re: Community Petition Request to Terminate Contract with Flock Safety

Dear DTCID Board Members:

We write as residents, business owners, and community stakeholders of the Dutchtown neighborhood to respectfully request that the Dutchtown Community Improvement District terminate its contract with Flock Safety for automated license plate reader (ALPR) cameras operating in our community in light of the company's data-sharing relationship with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

This letter does not take a categorical position against surveillance technology or its potential utility in public safety efforts. We acknowledge that ALPR systems may provide investigative leads in certain criminal cases. However, after careful consideration of recent revelations regarding Flock Safety’s data-sharing practices with federal immigration authorities, the undersigned agree that any potential investigative benefits are substantially outweighed by serious due-process concerns and the very real risks these systems pose to our neighbors.

DUTCHTOWN’S COMMUNITY’S VALUES

The Dutchtown neighborhood has always been strengthened by its diversity and its commitment to uplifting and protecting all its residents. Many of our neighbors, including lawful permanent residents, naturalized citizens, visa holders, and their families, face heightened vulnerability in the current political and immigration enforcement climate. We have deep concerns for the safety and well-being of these community members who are being targeted by ICE.

Our request is grounded in protecting our neighbors and ensuring that publicly-funded infrastructure in our community is not weaponized against our own neighbors. This is not a partisan issue; it is a matter of community trust, constitutional protections, and the basic safety of our friends and neighbors.  Dutchtown was built by immigrants and Dutchtown will continue to be a place where immigrants are welcomed by the community that needs them to thrive.

DOCUMENTED FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ACCESS TO FLOCK DATA

Recent investigative reporting and public records requests have revealed that ICE and federal immigration authorities have gained access to Flock data through multiple means despite the company’s initial claims to the contrary. The evidence includes:

Direct “Front Door” Access:

At least eight Washington state law enforcement agencies enabled direct, one-to-one sharing of their Flock networks with U.S. Border Patrol during 2025, including police departments in Arlington, Auburn, Lakewood, Richland, Sunnyside, Wenatchee, and Yakima.[1]

Unauthorized “Back Door” Access:

U.S. Border Patrol gained apparent unauthorized access to license plate data from at least ten local Washington law enforcement agencies that had not explicitly authorized such sharing, occurring from at least May to August 2025.[2]

Five Virginia counties (Fairfax, Chesterfield, Isle of Wight, Loudoun, and Stafford) shared data with federal authorities for approximately 50 immigration-related enforcement searches between June 2024 and April 2025, despite prohibitions against using the surveillance for such operations.[3]

“Side Door” Proxy Searches:

More than 4,000 searches of Flock databases have been conducted by state and local law enforcement agencies on behalf of federal immigration authorities, giving ICE “side-door access” to a tool for which it does not have a formal contract.[4]

San Francisco Police Department allowed out-of-state police to make over 1.6 million searches of its Flock database, with searches explicitly marked as ICE-related, in direct violation of California state law.[5]

Virginia’s Flock Safety network was searched nearly 3,000 times over a 12-month period using terms like ‘ICE,’ ‘ERO,’ ‘immigration,’ and ‘deportee.’[6]

Denver’s Flock cameras were accessed for ICE-related searches beginning June 13, 2024, with searches conducted by out-of-state agencies from Texas, Oklahoma, Arizona, Kansas, Arkansas, Alabama, and Florida.[7]

Admitted Federal Pilot Programs:

Flock CEO Garrett Langley publicly admitted in August 2025 that the company had engaged in “limited pilots” with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), which were conducted without properly informing local government clients or establishing compliance protocols.[8]

CONCERNS AROUND LEGAL DUE PROCESS

Beyond immigration enforcement specifically, the Flock system presents fundamental due process and oversight problems. Many local agencies using Flock were completely unaware that federal authorities were accessing their data and some agencies never ran network audits or did not know how to access them.[9] When local law enforcement conducts a Flock search, they can access not only their own cameras but also cameras in other states and even nationwide, creating a surveillance network far beyond what local officials authorized.[10]  A Washington state court ruled in November 2025 that Flock camera images are public records that can be requested by anyone, raising additional privacy concerns about who ultimately has access to this data.[11]  The system’s audit logs have proven inadequate for oversight, as demonstrated by the millions of unauthorized searches that occurred before being discovered through independent journalism and public records requests.

MUNICIPALITIES THAT HAVE TERMINATED FLOCK CONTRACTS

Communities across the United States have responded to these revelations by terminating their Flock Safety contracts or suspending operations. This growing list demonstrates that communities across the country, after careful consideration, have determined that Flock’s surveillance infrastructure poses unacceptable risks to their communities despite the purported benefits.

Terminated Contracts:

• Austin, Texas – Contract allowed to expire June 30, 2025, after scanning 113 million plates and City Council determination that privacy concerns outweighed benefits[12]

• Evanston, Illinois – All 19 cameras shut down and contract terminated effective September 26, 2025, after state audit found illegal data sharing with federal agencies[13]

• Oak Park, Illinois – Contract terminated August 5, 2025[14]

• Hays County, Texas – Commissioners voted 3-2 in October 2025 to terminate all Flock contracts due to data privacy and ICE concerns[15]

• Richmond, Virginia – Cut off data sharing in June 2025 after discovering ATF made immigration-related searches without notification[16]

Suspended or Significantly Limited Operations:

• Redmond, Washington – Completely suspended all Flock camera use in November 2025 after ICE arrests in the city[17]

• Woodburn, Oregon – Suspended 24 Flock cameras for minimum two months in November 2025 after resident concerns about ICE[18]

• Lynnwood, Washington – Disabled all system access and turned off cameras in October 2025[19]

• Boulder, Colorado – Withdrew from national network in June 2025, limiting sharing to Colorado agencies only[20]

• San Marcos, Texas – Voted 5-2 to reject expansion of Flock program in June 2025[21]

• Sedona, Arizona – Paused program in August 2025 amid surveillance and data-sharing concerns[22]

THE LIMITS OF “LOCAL CONTROL”

Flock Safety maintains that municipalities “own their own data” and control who can access it. The Dutchtown Community Improvement District may believe the same.  However, this claim provides false assurance.  Federal agencies can and have obtained Flock data through subpoenas served directly on Flock Safety, regardless of municipal preferences.[23]  Even when municipalities restrict data-sharing settings, the company’s national network architecture has allowed unauthorized “back door” access that agencies were unaware was occurring.[24]  Federal law enforcement can simply ask other Flock customers to run searches or share login credentials, completely bypassing any local restrictions.[25]  In practice, municipalities and local entities like DTCID have far less control over their Flock data than the company’s marketing materials suggest.

PETITION TO END DTCID CONTRACT WITH FLOCK

For the reasons outlined above, we respectfully but urgently request that the Dutchtown Community Improvement District:

Vote to terminate the existing contract with Flock Safety at the earliest opportunity;
Immediately restrict any data-sharing settings to the most limited scope possible;
Demand full audit logs from Flock Safety showing every agency that has accessed Dutchtown’s camera data, including the stated reasons for each search; and
Commit to robust community engagement before considering any future surveillance technology deployments in our neighborhood.
We recognize that public safety is a legitimate concern, and we do not suggest that the DTCID Board has acted with anything but good intentions around public safety. However, the evidence now available demonstrates that Flock Safety’s systems create risks that our community, particularly our neighbors who are vulnerable and fearful of deportation action.  This cannot stand.

Other public safety tools and community-based approaches exist that do not carry these constitutional, privacy, and civil liberties concerns. We urge the DTCID to join the growing number of communities that have decided Flock Safety’s cameras are inconsistent with their values and the safety of all their residents.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss this matter further with the Board and are available to present these concerns at an upcoming DTCID meeting or public forum.

Thank you for your consideration and for your continued service to the Dutchtown community.

 

Respectfully,

 

The Undersigned Dutchtown Community

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FOOTNOTES

[1] University of Washington Center for Human Rights, “Leaving the Door Wide Open: Flock Surveillance Systems Expose Washington Data to Immigration Enforcement” (Oct. 21, 2025)

[2] See note 1.

[3] Virginia Center for Investigative Journalism, “The feds’ hidden immigration weapon: Virginia’s surveillance network,” VPM News (July 7, 2025)

[4] “Reported: ICE using automated license-plate-reader cameras for immigration enforcement via state/local police,” Immigration Policy Tracking Project (May 27, 2025)

[5] “SFPD let Georgia, Texas cops illegally search city surveillance data on behalf of ICE,” San Francisco Standard (Sept. 8, 2025)

[6] See note 5.

[7] “Coalition of Civil Rights and Advocacy Organizations Deeply Opposed to Use of Flock Cameras for ICE Surveillance,” ACLU of Colorado (Aug. 11, 2025)

[8] “Flock Safety pauses partnership with federal agencies amid concerns about cameras being misused,” KOCO 5 News (Aug. 26, 2025)

[9] “Washington state confronts expanding surveillance system as Flock draws fire,” Biometric Update (Nov. 9, 2025)

[10] See note 4.

[11] “Washington Court Rules That Data Captured on Flock Safety Cameras Are Public Records,” Electronic Frontier Foundation (Nov. 12, 2025)

[12] “Flock CEO responds to Austin backlash as city contract nears expiration,” CBS Austin (June 21, 2025)

[13] “Evanston shuts down license plate cameras, terminates contract with Flock Safety,” Evanston RoundTable (Aug. 26, 2025)

[14] “Evanston halts license plate reader cameras after Illinois data shared with feds,” Chicago Tribune (Sept. 2, 2025)

[15] “Hays County terminates automatic license plate reader contract,” Community Impact (Oct. 15, 2025)

[16] “I’m Hearing About More Pushback Against Flock, Fueled by Concern Over Anti-Immigrant Uses,” ACLU (Aug. 21, 2025)

[17] “Redmond PD completely suspends Flock camera use amid statewide concerns over ICE access,” KOMO News (Nov. 7, 2025)

[18] “Woodburn suspends Flock Safety license plate cameras amid concerns of federal ICE enforcement,” Portland Tribune (Nov. 11, 2025)

[19] “Washington Cities Question Use of License Plate Readers Citing Federal Overreach,” The Urbanist (Nov. 13, 2025)

[20] “Until recently, Boulder shared license plate data on a national network accessed by ICE,” Boulder Reporting Lab (Aug. 19, 2025)

[21] “Austin’s license plate reader program will end this month,” KUT Radio (June 9, 2025)

[22] “FACT BRIEF: Is a private security company known for sharing license-plate data with ICE operating in Arizona?,” Arizona Center for Investigative Reporting (Aug. 28, 2025)

[23] “SU says DPS controls oversight, law enforcement’s access to campus Flock data,” The Daily Orange (Sept. 18, 2025)

[24] See note 1.

[25] “Public Interest Law Firm Responds to Flock Safety Pausing Federal Access to License Plate Reader Cameras,” Institute for Justice (Aug. 28, 2025)