Dear Regina Board of Police Commissioners:

Our demand is simple: that the Regina Board of Police Commissioners publicly commit to reviewing and implementing the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (OIPC) recommendations (Investigation Report 123-2025) related to the breach of public trust and unauthorized access to databases. 

Here's why this matters.

At least two members of the Regina Police Service have been found guilty of accessing electronic databases without authorization to target and exploit women. Sgt. Robert Semenchuck pleaded guilty to breaching trust and using a computer to pursue personal and intimate relationships with over three dozen women.

More recently, Constable Clinton Duquette was found to have used RPS databases to access confidential information of six people, including his his former partner, the former partner's sibling and the former partner’s previous partner, along with other individuals on 67 occasions. According to media reports, the "conduct by Const. Clinton Duquette was so egregious and the police force's response so minimal that privacy commissioner Grace Hession David has taken the rare step of referring the breach to the Attorney General for prosecution." The matter has been sent to the Attorney General for review of prosecution.

The Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (OIPC) has independently reviewed the breaches, as well as the actions taken by RPS and found them to be “wholly inadequate”. As the OIPC went on to write, “The misuse of a police information system for the personal reasons of a staff member seriously undermines not just the trust of the affected individuals but the public as a whole. This privacy breach is highly concerning.” 

The Board must review and incorporate the following OIPC recommendations:

(1) That RPS inform the remaining affected individuals of their right of access under section 5 of LA FOIP so they may choose to submit a formal access to information request to RPS for a summary of the dates and times the police officer searched their personal information. 

(2) That the police officer’s access to IEIS (Integrated
Electronic Information System) be permanently revoked. 1 The other OIPC file numbers associated with this matter include: 152-2025; 207-2025 and 278- 2025.

(3) Should RPS not revoke the police officer’s access privileges to IEIS, then it is recommended that RPS conduct focused and targeted audits on the police officer’s access to IEIS on a monthly basis for an indefinite period to ensure that: (i) the police officer is no longer accessing the personal information of the six affected individuals; and (ii) going forward, the police officer only accesses the personal information on IEIS on a need-to-know basis. 

(4) That RPS install a feature into IEIS that requires RPS members to provide a reason with sufficient particularity when conducting queries. Such a feature will assist RPS in conducting audits to ensure lawful access of personal information in IEIS. 

(5) That the RPS conduct random audits of queries by RPS members (sworn and civilian) of information databases that contain personal information. Audits should be conducted from random samples of a pool of RPS employees, rather than just random audits of RPS files. 

(6) That RPS ensure its Access and Privacy Unit is sufficiently resourced to perform audits of access to IEIS and any other information databases that contain personal information, including CPIC and the SGI database. 

(7) That RPS implement a protocol for conducting audits of an employee’s access to personal information in cases where there is evidence that an employee has made an unauthorized access, or in cases where the RPS has reason to suspect the employee may have made unauthorized accesses to personal information. 

(8) That RPS commit to a policy of zero tolerance for unauthorized breaches of personal information. 

(9) That this matter be conveyed to the Attorney General of Saskatchewan for an opinion with respect to prosecution pursuant to section 56(2) of LA FOIP.

Public trust in the RPS has been compromised. Implementing the Privacy Commissioner’s recommendations would address what appears to be a systemic problem within Regina Police Service. This matter is urgent and we ask that you act quickly to resolve these problems.