Could the Manama Negotiations Potentially Lead to an End of the Sudanese Conflict?
Amgad Fareid Eltayeb
Read the article in Arabic
The news reported on a delegation from the Sudanese Civil Political Forces Alliance (Taqadum) visiting Juba in response to an invitation to meet with South Sudanese President Selva Kiir, led by the chairperson of Taqadum's leadership body and former Prime Minister Abdulla Hamdok.
On January 2, 2024, Taqadum coalition and Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (Hemedti), the commander of the Rapid Support Forces militia, concluded an agreement about ending the war. Subsequently, Hemedti embarked on a diplomatic tour across the region and the continent. This development complicated the initiative of the IGAD quadripartite, comprising Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, aimed to enable a direct meeting between Hemedti and army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in an effort to reach a cease fire. The meeting between Taqadum and Hemiditi was occurring at the same time that the Djiboutian Foreign Affairs Service announced the meeting between the two generals would have to be postponed because the militia leader would not be able to get to Djibouti for technical reasons. Later, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared Sudan would terminate all cooperation with IGAD regarding the Sudanese crisis. This was in objection to IGAD’s invitation for Hemedti to attend the IGAD head of states summit in Entebbe, Uganda.
The IGAD efforts hit a deadlock, while the Sudanese army continued to announce military victories and make progress in regaining control of the capital Khartoum, and the "Rapid Support Forces" continued their attack on the city of Babnoussa in the state of West Kordofan, in an attempt to seize the Army (22) division's headquarters. In parallel, reports surfaced of secret meetings of high-level delegations from the army and militia leaderships in Bahrain's capital, Manama. It was revealed that these meetings - or rather this negotiating path - are sponsored by five Arab countries, led by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain, with the latter's capital chosen as the venue for the negotiations as a neutral site free of any prior biases to either party to the conflict. The Manama track talks intend to overcome the deadlock that concluded the IGAD mediation track and prepare a consolidated agreement of cessation of hostilities on a long-term basis, which will be signed by army and militia commanders later in Jeddah.
Certainly, reaching a ceasefire, or a permanent cessation of hostilities, is what every Sudanese, and everyone who cares about Sudan's interests now desires for, especially given the dire humanitarian situation caused by the war, which is leading \to declare a severe famine in Sudan in a matter of days or weeks. In any case, the conditions that existed prior to the conflict and were directly responsible for it must not be allowed to be replicated. Any power-sharing deal that split power between the two warring military parties would result in a future, more disastrous war. This negotiation should not end with the arms bearers agreeing to divide power among themselves and using war to compel the Sudanese into returning to the conditions of the military coup that existed prior to the war in terms of their control over the country. Rather, it is hoped that it would provide a glimmer of hope for resuming the course of realizing the goals of the December 2018 revolution that overturned the Bashir dictatorship. The Sudanese army requires substantial and drastic reform to restore its efficacy and professionalism outside the realm of politics. Regarding the RSF militia, promoting Sudan's surrender to it by accepting its continued institutional presence, let alone allowing it to play a political role, by establishing the concept that stopping the war and reaching a peaceful negotiated solution can only be accomplished by relinquishing to its conditions and political demands while embracing them with fait accompli justifications and political rationality, is absolute madness and nefarious deception. Al-Bashir and his regime were a fait accompli, but millions of Sudanese men and women chose to fight until they ousted them after three decades of multifaceted confrontation.
Furthermore, the anti-war standpoint and the campaign to end it are unconcerned with the military achievements or military expansion of one party over the other. These are variables in an equation that those seeking to end the conflict are fundamentally at odds with. The anti-war stance is one that opposes both warring parties and the use of weapons to impose a political reality, and it exclusively supports the safety and security of Sudanese men and women in what remains of their homeland.
The Manama track will only benefit the country and its people if it achieves a meaningful and workable ceasefire or cessation of hostilities agreement with implementation and enforcement mechanisms that allow citizens to return to some sort of normal life. This entails ensuring that both parties are serious about negotiating defined goals and that negotiators can force their implementation to avoid wasting time. The presence of Egypt, which wields substantial influence over SAF, and the United Arab Emirates, which fully controls the RSF's decisions, among the track's sponsors is a promising omen. Also, the presence of Qatar, which has long-standing relations and profound influence on the Islamists in Sudan, who are the visible and hidden party in this war, can help ensure the effectiveness of this mediation, which must not go beyond the military details of a ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities. It would greatly benefit the future peace and stability in Sudan if the sponsoring countries utilized their influence and relationships with all Sudanese parties to ensure the involvement of all Sudanese armed parties and movements in the ceasefire arrangements and the success of this should not be contingent upon any pre-conditioned political demands or ambitions.
To properly tackle the complex issues in Sudan, it is imperative that any political process occur subsequent to the establishment of a ceasefire and the successful execution of a permanent cessation of hostilities. Moreover, such a process should be devoid of any participation from the armed sides presently involved in this conflict, encompassing the army and the Rapid Support forces. The political armed movements should be offered a clear choice between engaging as political entities in figuring out the nation's future through participation in this process or undergoing security and military reforms as armed groupings without political involvement. However, it could not have both options simultaneously.
This process must encompass all political and societal factions in Sudan while excluding only the parties, individuals, or entities implicated in perpetrating crimes and transgressions against the Sudanese people. The political process needs to be established based on clear, natural, and reasonable standards for the formation of modern states. It is necessary to reform the military institution and bring all its branches under civilian political oversight, as well as dismantle the institutional existence of the "Rapid Support Forces" with all its extensions, whether they be military, economic, or political. Nevertheless, the specific aspects of this matter will ultimately be addressed in a subsequent phase, wherein the Sudanese civil forces will engage in an inclusive and impartial process.
Another issue with the cessation of hostilities agreement is the necessity to agree on methods for implementation and enforcement on the ground. It will be pointless to go through the formalities of signing a ceasefire again, which the two parties did more than ten times during previous negotiating rounds in Jeddah without adhering to and executing them. Any cease-fire agreement should contain unambiguous arrangements on lines of separation between forces, as well as neutral international or regional enforcement and monitoring mechanisms to guarantee that these arrangements are reflected on the ground, instead of political outbidding and media deceit witnessed before. The countries sponsoring the Manama track, whether through the Arab League, neighboring countries, or in collaboration with the African Union or even the United Nations, can supply forces on the ground to secure force separation and implement the deal they sponsor.
Both parties are currently focused on making progress on the ground to improve their negotiating opportunities, but unfortunately, they are overlooking the impact of these battles on civilians trapped in combat zones. There have been over ten previous ceasefire agreements that went in vain, and accusations of violations between the two parties were exchanged. This shows that it is necessary to have other forces present to enforce the agreement and protect civilians from breaches.
Lastly, explicit procedures for protecting civilians, upholding the law, and creating secure passageways for the movement must be included in the cessation of hostilities agreement. The flow of humanitarian aid should have priority over anything else. The basic rights of Sudanese to life, security, and property are not items for negotiation. No one has the authority to bargain over the looted properties or houses of the Sudanese. It is unacceptable for anyone to use these basic rights as leverage for political gain. The Sudanese should not be manipulated or extorted into sacrificing their rights and security for the sake of any party war agenda.
If the quintet of Arab countries successfully persuades and compel the two parties to cease hostilities on the ground, and ensure that this cessation is implemented, they will have done a significant service to the Sudanese people and made significant progress in the effort to end the war, paving the way for a broad and reasonable political process to determine the country's future. This process requires ending the multiplicity of initiatives that continued to reproduce one after another and stopping their counterproductive competition with each other. The initiatives and committees of IGAD, the African Union, neighboring countries, and the Troika, which includes the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Kingdom of Norway, in addition to the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Ramatane Lamamra), and what has recently leaked in the news about the state of Algeria’s readiness to put a new initiative on the table, need to coordinate tightly among themselves, distribute roles, and work through a unified platform to foster a comprehensive and foundational political process to help Sudanese achieving the slogans of freedom, peace, and justice, whose banners were raised by the Sudanese revolution in December. This requires that it be designed in consultation with the widest spectrum of Sudanese, especially the youth groups that actively participated in the course of the revolution, and ensuring the participation of all, except for those who refuse or whose hands were marked by committing crimes against the people of Sudan.