3,000 Days: A Story of Inaction at Martin Dunham Reservoir
A new state inspection confirms what 3,000 days already prove.
February 2026 | SaveDunham.org
In a recently released letter dated February 3, 2026, describing a visual inspection conducted January 20, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation has confirmed what advocates have argued for months: the Martin Dunham Reservoir Dam in Grafton, Rensselaer County remains in a formally recognized unsafe condition, its emergency response plan is incomplete, and a required engineering assessment is now three years overdue.
The math is simple.
The DEC assigned this dam a condition rating of "Unsound – Deficiency Recognized" in February 2018. That is roughly 3,000 days ago. In the state's own regulatory language, that rating means "the dam deficiencies are of such a nature that the safety of the dam cannot be assured."
The dam has not been rehabilitated. The rating has not changed. The clock keeps running.
The letter, addressed to the NYS Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation, documents a pattern of deferred action on a structure the state itself classifies as a High Hazard Dam. But the condition of the dam today is only part of the story. The trajectory of this situation, inspection letters dating to 2018 documenting deficiencies that remain unresolved, no rehabilitation schedule, and a required engineering assessment now three years overdue, raises a question that no official body is addressing publicly: what happens next? And if removal is ultimately pursued, what are the downstream consequences for Brunswick residents and properties, and who is responsible for studying them?
No Emergency Plan
No Inundation Map for What Actually Matters.
The February letter confirms that the dam's Emergency Action Plan, last reviewed in 2025, remains incomplete. It lacks both a completed Promulgation and Concurrence form, the document confirming the plan has been distributed to and coordinated with local emergency responders, and inundation mapping.
An inundation map for catastrophic failure does exist. What does not exist is any modeling for the more probable events: a post-tropical storm system, days of sustained heavy rain, a spring rain-on-snow event. These are not hypothetical scenarios in Rensselaer County. They are the conditions this watershed experiences regularly.
Hurricane Irene struck the region in August 2011 and produced documented, significant flooding across Rensselaer County, including in Poestenkill and Grafton. The Troy Record documented road closures including a bridge-out on Fox Hollow Road in Grafton/Petersburgh, and multiple road failures in Poestenkill including Dater Hill Road and Plank Road. A home on Plank Road along the Poestenkill Creek sustained damage so severe the addition was later demolished. Rensselaer County localities received $3.5 million in state infrastructure repair funding as a direct result of Irene damage. The USGS formally included Rensselaer County in its federally supported post-Irene flood study of New York State. All of that happened with the reservoir in place. Nobody has modeled what a storm of that scale produces under current degraded conditions, let alone after a permanent structural change to this watershed.
Sources: Troy Record, August 2011 and August 2012; USGS Scientific Investigations Report 2014-5058, Floods of 2011 in New York.
An Engineering Assessment Three Years Overdue
State regulations require High Hazard dams to undergo a full Engineering Assessment every ten years. The second EA for the Martin Dunham dam was due on or before February 7, 2023.
It has not been submitted.
The DEC's February letter does not announce that the assessment is forthcoming. It asks Parks to provide "a plan and schedule" for submitting it, meaning the agency responsible for a dam rated unsafe does not yet have a committed timeline for completing an evaluation that is already three years late. The DEC has set a 60-day deadline for that response.
The Infrastructure Can't Do What Engineers Recommended
The 2025 Safety Inspection Report, prepared by engineers Cyrus Garner and Chris Carter of Stantec, recommended reducing the reservoir's water level as a way to decrease the downstream hazard. The existing infrastructure cannot lower the reservoir to the level those engineers recommended.
The low-level drain in the dike is reportedly non-functional. The only working low-level outlet, located near the service spillway, lacks the hydraulic capacity to bring the reservoir down to the recommended elevation. During the January 20 inspection, the service spillway was actively flowing, with water going over the crest, even with that outlet open. The reservoir was sitting at its maximum normal operating level in the middle of winter.
The DEC's letter suggests that Parks consult with its engineer about adding a pump or siphon to compensate. That consultation has not yet occurred, and no pump is in place.
Deterioration Across the Structure
The January inspection documented concrete deterioration at multiple locations: the outlet conduit, the toe drain headwall, which "appears to be leaning into the channel," and the low-level outlet structure. Woody debris and voids were noted on the spillway weir. Trees and brush were flagged within twenty feet of the dike perimeter on both embankments, a maintenance concern appearing in prior inspection records as well.
Seepage and ponded water along the right downstream toe of the dike were noted, described as consistent with "past inspections." None of these observations are new. That is precisely the problem.
The State's Own Words
In directing Parks to complete its annual environmental audit, the DEC's letter instructs the agency to enter "N2" in Status Box 53A on the Compliance Status Form.
The N2 designation means the dam poses a potential substantial threat to the public health or the environment.
That language belongs to the state. Not to advocates. Not to this publication. To the agency that conducted the inspection and signed the letter.
This letter does not propose removal. It documents continued unsafe status without a rehabilitation schedule. But the absence of any credible path to rehabilitation, after 3,000 days, a missed engineering assessment deadline, and an incomplete emergency plan, is itself a finding that demands public attention.
If removal is ultimately pursued, downstream flood modeling would be essential. No such modeling has been presented publicly. The Martin Dunham Reservoir impounds approximately 100 acres of water. A shallow constructed wetland cannot replicate that storage capacity. Every storm that currently deposits water into that reservoir would, after removal, send that water elsewhere, downhill, toward Brunswick, toward properties and roads that do not flood today precisely because the reservoir exists above them.
Peer-reviewed research supports this concern. A 2024 study published in ScienceDirect found that constructed wetlands "frequently exceed their maximum storage capacity" during major storm events and provide "limited flood regulation services" as a result.
The New York State DEC's own guidance documentation notes that in watersheds where wetlands have been lost, flood peaks may increase by as much as 80 percent. A shallow constructed wetland of one to three feet depth holds a fraction of the water volume that a deep reservoir retains. It cannot buffer a major storm event the way an impoundment can. Replacing Martin Dunham Reservoir with a wetland is not a neutral act. It is a permanent reduction in the watershed's capacity to absorb water, and the consequences of that reduction will fall on the people who live below it.
Sources: ScienceDirect, "Flood Mitigation at Catchment Scale: Assessing the Effectiveness of Constructed Wetlands" (2024); Vermont DEC, "Wetland Functions and Values: Water Storage for Flood Water and Storm Runoff."
Hurricane Irene struck in August 2011 and still produced documented road failures and infrastructure damage across Grafton, Poestenkill, and the surrounding area, with the reservoir in place. If removal is pursued, the state must answer before any ground is broken: what does the next comparable storm look like without that storage capacity in place? Which properties in Grafton, Poestenkill, and Brunswick flood that did not before? Which roads become impassable? What assurances can the state provide to homeowners and businesses downstream that removal will not transfer flood risk onto private residents who had no voice in creating it?
SaveDunham.org advocates for the repair or replacement of this dam, built to modern safety standards, for the benefit of the communities of Grafton, Poestenkill, and Brunswick. A properly engineered modern dam protects the watershed, preserves the reservoir's flood retention capacity, and eliminates the safety concerns that have gone unaddressed for 3,000 days. That is the outcome these communities deserve.
The Effort Continues
SaveDunham.org along with the Save Dunham Committee have pressed for transparency since the beginning of this effort, working with elected officials on both sides of the aisle and drawing on the talents and contacts of a community that cares about this place. That work continues until there is a clear path forward, one that accounts for the safety of the dam, the integrity of the watershed, and the people who live in its shadow.
The 60-day deadline for Parks to respond to the DEC falls in early April 2026. We will be watching.
You can read and download the letter here.
Please sign and share the petition. Share these updates, link the Save Dunham Facebook page, and stay engaged. Only through sustained, vocal public advocacy will the Dunham be saved from decommissioning.
DISCLAIMER
This article is based on publicly available government documents, including the DEC inspection letter dated February 3, 2026 and the accompanying Visual Observations Report. All quoted language is drawn directly from those documents. This article is not an engineering assessment and should not be treated as one. References to downstream flood impacts, watershed hydrology, and wetland capacity represent the informed analysis and advocacy position of SaveDunham.org and are not a substitute for professional engineering evaluation. The Irene flooding claims are sourced to contemporaneous reporting by the Troy Record (August 2011 and August 2012) and the USGS Floods of 2011 in New York report (Scientific Investigations Report 2014-5058). The wetland storage capacity argument is supported by peer-reviewed research published in ScienceDirect (2024) and Vermont DEC wetland function guidance. Readers are encouraged to review the source documents and conduct their own research. No removal has been proposed or announced by any state agency. SaveDunham.org is not affiliated with the DEC, NYS Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation, or any state agency. Readers with questions about the regulatory status of this dam are encouraged to contact the DEC Bureau of Flood Protection and Dam Safety directly.