This Article examines the process of judicial selection in New York State in light of the recent court decisions in White and Spargo, which have paved the way for increased campaign speech in judicial elections. Relying on empirical data to compare judicial elections and appointments in New York City between 1977and 2002, the Article finds that ejections produce a judiciary that is more beholden to interest groups than one generated through appointments.The consequence of this greater special interest involvement is an erosion of public trust and confidence in the judiciary. Moreover while elections arguably have increased diversity in the New York City judiciary, elections have not achieved the same result at the state-wide level. The Article concludes that New York State should abandon judicial
elections and implement a merit selection system with a diverse, non-or-bipartisan nominating commission at its core.
A majority of all cases in the United States are decided by judges whose continued tenure is contingent upon elections. This fact is attributable to another: most judgeships in the United States are elective offices. More than surprising, these two facts are curious, even anomalous, for judges are elected on a similar scale in no other constitutional democracy in the
world.