Please help us support Katie and reunite her with her children that desperately need and want to be with their mother. Also, if you can please consider donating a small amount to her legal fund it would be greatly appreciated,. anything would help tremendously. I'd also like to thank everyone that has signed the petition from the bottom of my heart. Thank you again so much for your support! Please pray for Katie and her precious children! http://www.gofundme.com/xg83kgyw IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION KATHERINE MARIE DAVENPORT, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CASE NO.: DR-2013-900613.00 ) (Consolidated with DR-2013-900665.00) ANDREW ATKINS DAVENPORT, ) ) Defendant. ) PLAINTIFF’S RULE 59 MOTION TO ALTER, VACATE OR AMEND COMES NOW the Plaintiff, KATHERINE MARIE DAVENPORT, by and through her counsel of record, KEITH E. BRASHIER, of the law firm of BURNS, BRASHIER & JOHNSON, LLC, and respectfully moves this Honorable Court pursuant to Rule 59 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure to alter, vacate or amend its Order entered in this matter on June 3, 2015, or, in the alternative, to grant Plaintiff a new trial. As grounds therefore, the Plaintiff avers as follows: 1. Said Order is contrary to the law and evidence. 2. Said Order is so contrary to the law and evidence as to constitute a miscarriage of justice. 3. Said Order is not supported by the evidence. 4. Said Order is contrary to the evidence. 5. Said Order is not only contrary to the law and evidence, but is so slanted in Defendant’s favor that it appears to show the Court to be improperly biased in favor of the Defendant. 6. Said Order is not only contrary to the law and evidence, but contains provisions restricting Plaintiff’s behavior without sufficient basis, thus, showing the Court to be improperly biased in favor of the Defendant. For example, in paragraph 7 of the Order the Court forbids either 2 party from consuming “alcohol or proscribed substances during any time the children are with them, or within 6 hours prior thereto.” No evidence was presented that Plaintiff had any drug or alcohol problems. Rather, the evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding that Defendant had drug and alcohol problems, having being arrested twice for possession of marijuana and with photos being admitted into evidence of Defendant consuming alcohol and showing him passed out drunk. So, although the restrictions imposed in paragraph 7 of the Order are appropriate for the Defendant, said restricts are not necessary for Plaintiff. The restrictions on the Plaintiff’s behavior without any basis in the evidence for such demonstrates the Court’s bias against the Plaintiff. Another, especially cruel example of the Court’s bias against the Plaintiff is the fact that the Court chose the birthday of the parties’ daughter, Emma Davenport, as the day to enter the Order stripping the Plaintiff of custody and terminating her role as mother in the major decisions affecting the children. Now, Plaintiff will have a yearly reminder of the day she lost her children. 7. Said Order contains no finding of facts used by the Court to support any of the material provisions included in the Order, forcing the parties to speculate as to why the Court ruled the way that it did. 8. Paragraph 3 of said Order is in error, is contrary to the law and evidence, constitutes a miscarriage of justice, is not supported by the evidence, and is so slanted in Defendant’s favor that it appears to show the Court to be improperly biased in favor of the Defendant. 9. Paragraph 3 of said Order is contrary to the weight of the evidence and testimony presented at trial. The evidence was undisputed that the Plaintiff has always been the primary caregiver for the minor children. The evidence was undisputed that Defendant’s role throughout the marriage was “breadwinner”, and that Defendant had little involvement in the day to day rearing of the children, or in the decisions regarding the education and medical treatment of the children. The evidence was undisputed that the Plaintiff took the lead role in the physical therapy of Emma 3 Davenport to treat her hip dysplasia. The evidence was undisputed that Defendant’s family were estranged from the parties for periods of several years, and the evidence was undisputed that Plaintiff’s family had always been supportive of the parties, financially and otherwise. The evidence was undisputed that after the Pendente Lite Order was entered, the Defendant refused to communicate with the Plaintiff regarding the health of the minor children and the injuries they sustained while in his care, causing the Plaintiff to panic and suffer emotional distress. The evidence was undisputed that the Defendant did not take an active role in the lives of the children until after the Pendente Lite Order was entered forcing the Defendant to finally take a more active role in caring for the children, at least every other week. Further, the evidence showed that it was Defendant’s parents, mainly his mother, who actually cared for the children during the Defendant’s pendente lite custodial time as Defendant was working long hours, often out of town. The evidence was undisputed that Defendant has been arrested twice for possession of marijuana, that Defendant has a drinking problem, and that Defendant continued to consume alcohol throughout the divorce per his own admission and per his bank statements admitted into evidence. The evidence was undisputed that Plaintiff has no criminal history, no drinking problem, and no drug problem. The evidence is completely contrary to an award of sole custody to the Defendant. 10. Paragraph 3 of said Order is erroneous and is contrary to the provisions of Alabama Code § 30-3-150 (1975) et. al. which establishes a presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of children, stating in pertinent part: "It is the policy of this state to assure that minor children have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of their children and to encourage parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of rearing their children after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage." The evidence in this case does not support the award of sole custody to the Defendant. The evidence was 4 insufficient to overcome the presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the children. Otherwise, the evidence supported the award of sole custody to the Plaintiff. 11. The Court erred by either ignoring or incorrectly applying the required factors set out in Alabama Code § 30-3-152 (1975). Said statute reads as follows: (a) The court shall in every case consider joint custody but may award any form of custody which is determined to be in the best interest of the child. In determining whether joint custody is in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider the same factors considered in awarding sole legal and physical custody and all of the following factors: (1) The agreement or lack of agreement of the parents on joint custody. (2) The past and present ability of the parents to cooperate with each other and make decisions jointly. (3) The ability of the parents to encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact between the child and the other parent. (4) Any history of or potential for child abuse, spouse abuse, or kidnapping. (5) The geographic proximity of the parents to each other as this relates to the practical considerations of joint physical custody. (b) The court may order a form of joint custody without the consent of both parents, when it is in the best interest of the child. (c) If both parents request joint custody, the presumption is that joint custody is in the best interest of the child. Joint custody shall be granted in the final order of the court unless the court makes specific findings as to why joint custody is not granted. 12. The Court erred in failing to consider joint custody. Although there was evidence of a lack of ability of the parties to agree with each other on decisions regarding the children or the ability to cooperate with each other, those factors do not weigh in favor of the Defendant being awarded custody when the undisputed evidence was that the Plaintiff, not the Defendant, had always been the primary caregiver for the children. Further, there was evidence presented which, if it did 5 not show a history of spousal abuse and child abuse at the hands of Defendant, certainly showed a potential for spousal abuse and child abuse. The evidence supported a finding that the Defendant punched a hole in the wall of the marital residence in a rage. That evidence was undisputed. There was evidence of Defendant’s verbal and physical abuse of the Plaintiff. The DHR records admitted into evidence showed a finding that there was a lack of appropriate hygiene regarding the children while they were in custody of the Defendant. Finally, the close proximity of the residences of the parties supported a finding of joint custody. Regardless, if joint custody was not determined to be appropriate, the Court certainly erred in granting sole custody to the Defendant. 13. The Court erred in failing to make specific findings in the Order as to why joint custody was not granted, in violation of the requirement found in Alabama Code § 30-3-152(c) (1975). 14. Paragraphs 4 (a) - 4 (i) of said Order are in error, are contrary to the law and evidence, constitute a miscarriage of justice, are not supported by the evidence, and are so slanted in Defendant’s favor that it appears to show the Court to be improperly biased in favor of the Defendant. 15. Paragraphs 4 (a) - 4 (i) of said Order would be an appropriate visitation schedule for the Defendant if the Court had awarded either joint custody or sole custody to the Plaintiff. However, as written these paragraphs are erroneous and contrary to the law and evidence for the reasons previously outlined herein above. The custodial time schedule awarded to the Plaintiff in the Order is particularly egregious given the fact that the parties had been operating under a Pendente Lite Order for approximately a year and a half in which the parties shared joint legal and physical custody of the children with custodial periods alternating week to week. 16. Paragraphs 3 and Paragraphs 4 (a) - 4 (i) of said Order are contrary to the best interests of the minor children of the parties for the reasons previously outlined herein above. The 6 minor children are now at risk of suffering emotional harm by such a dramatic shift in custody, in their schedules and their way of life, especially given their young age. 17. Paragraph 6 of said Order is in error, is contrary to the law and evidence, constitutes a miscarriage of justice, is not supported by the evidence, and is so slanted in Defendant’s favor that it appears to show the Court to be improperly biased in favor of the Defendant. There is no justification for the inclusion of Paragraph 6 in the Order, except to prejudice the Plaintiff and as an attempt to bias the appellate courts against the Plaintiff in the forthcoming appeal of this case. The Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff secreted the children to New Jersey before the divorce was filed was contradicted by Defendant’s own testimony that he knew the trip was pre-planned and that during the trip the Plaintiff had frequent contact with the Defendant via telephone, text message and e-mail while she and the children were on the trip. Likewise, the Defendant had telephone and FaceTime contact with the children during this time, and the Plaintiff promptly returned to Alabama with the children when told by the Court to do so. In fact, the Plaintiff filed for divorce first, and she filed in Alabama, thus submitting herself to the jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, paragraph 6 is not supported by the evidence and has been included in the Order for an improper purpose. 18. Paragraph 7 of said Order is contrary to the law and evidence, constitutes a miscarriage of justice, is not supported by the evidence, and is so slanted in Defendant’s favor that it appears to show the Court to be improperly biased in favor of the Defendant. As previously stated, in paragraph 7 of the Order the Court forbids either party from consuming “alcohol or proscribed substances during any time the children are with them, or within 6 hours prior thereto.” No evidence was presented that Plaintiff had any drug or alcohol problems. Rather, the evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding that Defendant had drug and alcohol problems, having being arrested twice for possession of marijuana and with photos being admitted into evidence of 7 Defendant consuming alcohol and showing him passed out drunk. Paragraph 7 should be applicable to Defendant only, not to Plaintiff. Thus, it is in error. 19. Paragraph 9 of said Order is contrary to the law and evidence, constitutes a miscarriage of justice, is not supported by the evidence, and is so slanted in Defendant’s favor that it appears to show the Court to be improperly biased in favor of the Defendant. 20. The Plaintiff should at least be awarded joint legal and primary physical custody of the minor children, and the Defendant should be ordered to pay child support to the Plaintiff in accordance with Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration. The evidence supports such a finding. 21. If the Court refuses to alter the custody provisions as requested by Plaintiff herein, then Paragraph 9 as written would remain contrary to the law and evidence, constitute a miscarriage of justice, would not be supported by the evidence, and would be so slanted in Defendant’s favor that it would appear to show the Court to be improperly biased in favor of the Defendant. The Plaintiff was terminated from employment after the entry of the Order in this matter, as a direct result of her inability to work during the trial of this case. Even if she was still employed, her income is insufficient to provide the required child support payments, to pay the utilities on the marital residence, to pay 50% of non-covered medical expenses of the minor children and to pay her day to day living expenses. Paragraph 9 is especially egregious given the fact that Defendant earns over $80,000.00 per year and lives with his parents. If the custody provisions of the Order stand, then child support should be reserved or eliminated altogether. 22. For the reasons stated above, Paragraph 10 of said Order is contrary to the law and evidence, constitutes a miscarriage of justice, is not supported by the evidence, and is so slanted in Defendant’s favor that it appears to show the Court to be improperly biased in favor of the Defendant. 8 23. Paragraph 11 of said Order is contrary to the law and evidence, constitutes a miscarriage of justice, is not supported by the evidence, and is so slanted in Defendant’s favor that it appears to show the Court to be improperly biased in favor of the Defendant. The evidence was undisputed that Plaintiff’s family members contributed a total of approximately $20,000.00 toward the purchase of the marital residence. The Plaintiff testified that she requested the marital residence be awarded to her, and that she would assume the mortgage payments. Instead, the Court has displaced the Plaintiff by ordering the sale of the residence. The Plaintiff has no family in Alabama, which is well known by this Court. The Defendant testified that there was no equity in the marital residence. In light of those facts, coupled with Plaintiff’s request for the marital residence to be awarded to her, the Court erred in ordering the residence to be sold. Regardless, if the residence is sold and there is equity then the Plaintiff should recoup 100% of the equity to compensate for her family’s financial contribution toward the purchase of the home. The Plaintiff certainly should not be liable for any deficit, if any. 24. Paragraph 11 of said Order is in direct contradiction of Paragraph 14 of said Order in that Paragraph 11 orders the marital residence to be sold, and Paragraph 14 awards the marital 25. Paragraph 14 of said Order is contrary to the law and evidence, constitutes a miscarriage of justice, is not supported by the evidence, and is so slanted in Defendant’s favor that it appears to show the Court to be improperly biased in favor of the Defendant. The Court simply attached Defendant’s list of requested items of personal property without regard to Plaintiff’s testimony disputing some of the items on said list. 26. Paragraph 17 of said Order is contrary to the law and evidence, constitutes a miscarriage of justice, is not supported by the evidence, and is so slanted in Defendant’s favor that it appears to show the Court to be improperly biased in favor of the Defendant. Given the financial 9 condition of each party, the Defendant should be solely responsible for the debt on the Nissan Murano. The Plaintiff was forced to purchase a new vehicle and take on that debt after the Nissan Murano became inoperable. The Plaintiff has a great deal of debt as evidenced by her debt list admitted at trial. It is a miscarriage of justice to saddle Plaintiff with even more debt. 27. Paragraph 20 is contrary to the evidence. The parties did not stipulate that each party would be responsible for his or her own attorney’s fees and expenses. Rather, the Court told the counsel for both parties off the record and in chambers that the Court would not be ordering an award of attorney’s fees and expenses for either party regardless of whether either party requested same or presented evidence on that issue. 28. The Court erred in overruling the objections of Plaintiff’s counsel at trial, and the Court erred in sustaining the objections of Defendant’s counsel at trial. The Court erred in overruling the objections of Plaintiff’s counsel to the admission of items into evidence at trial, and the Court erred in sustaining the objections of Defendant’s counsel to the attempt by Plaintiff’s counsel to admit certain items into evidence at trial. 29. The Court erred in overruling the objection of Plaintiff’s counsel to the attempt by Defendant’s counsel to question the Plaintiff about an alleged intent to relocate with the minor children sometime in the future if the Plaintiff were awarded custody. That line of questioning was immaterial and irrelevant, and the consideration by the Court of that evidence is contrary to the law and prejudiced the Plaintiff. Such evidence should not have been admitted, and, even so, it is speculative and based on supposition, and is, thus, improper. The Alabama Parent-Child Relationship Protection Act only applies to cases in which there has already been an initial custody determination by prior order, or in cases in which the issue of relocation is presented along with an initial custody determination. See Lackey v. Lackey, 18 So.3d 393, 399 (Ala.Civ.App. 2009). The Pendente Lite Order in this case does not constitute an initial custody determination. See Ex parte 10 J.P., 641 So.2d 276 (Ala. 1994); Sims v. Sims, 515 So.2d 1 (Ala.Civ.App. 1987); Davis v. Moody, 459 So.2d 914 (Ala.Civ.App. 1984). The issue was not presented here. It was not pled by either party, and it was certainly not presented to the Court by the Plaintiff. The problem here is akin to the problems that Alabama Appellate Courts have found with automatic custodial-reversion clauses - that such "is premised on a mere speculation of what the best interests of the child[ ] may be at a future date." Hovater v. Hovater, 577 So.2d 461, 463 (Ala.Civ.App. 1990). The Court erred by overruling the objection of Plaintiff’s counsel to this line of questioning. The objection should have been sustained. The admission of that testimony into evidence was improper and was an abuse of discretion. The Court’s determination of custody in this matter was based upon improper speculation concerning the possibility of future changed circumstances, and, thus, is in error and should be vacated. A new trial should be granted. 30. The Court (the prior judge) erred by dictating a Pendente Lite Order in this matter from the bench without taking testimony or considering evidence. Said Pendente Lite Order granted joint legal and physical custody of the minor children to the parties, with alternating week to week custodial times. Said Pendente Lite Order violated Plaintiff’s due process rights under the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Alabama of 1901. Due process requires that the trial court consider evidence establishing the best interest of the minor children before awarding pendente lite custody. See Ex parte Russell, 911 So.2d 719, 725 (Ala.Civ.App.2005). “The unsworn statements, factual assertions, and arguments of counsel are not evidence." Id. citing Singley v. Bentley, 782 So.2d 799, 803 (Ala.Civ.App.2000). The Pendente Lite Order was unconstitutional and should be void. 31. The Pendente Lite Order set into place a highly tense situation between the parties and created a stressful and damaging schedule for the children in which one parent was pitted against the other. The Pendente Lite Order exacerbated the communication problems between the 11 parties. Defendant lived with his parents throughout this time, and had their help and support in raising the children during Defendant’s custodial weeks. On the other hand, the Plaintiff was for the first time in her life thrust into the role of a single mother. She was alone, having no family in the area to assist with raising the children. She had to go back to work, having been a stay-at-home mother for years prior. It was during this time that Plaintiff turned to a Safe House counselor and the children’s pediatrician for guidance through the difficult situation. When injuries and medical issues arose with the children and with Defendant nor his family providing appropriate and complete information, the Plaintiff made medical appointments for the children and contacted DHR directly on a couple of matters. DHR was contacted on other occasions by mandatory reporters, not the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff followed up with DHR social workers as directed. Again, the Plaintiff is forced to guess as to why the Court granted soled custody of the children to the Defendant, but given the arguments and trial strategy of Defendant’s counsel, along with statements made by the trial judge to counsel for both parties off the record in chambers, the Plaintiff assumes that her contact with DHR and the children’s physicians was used by the Court as a factor disfavoring her. However, that factor was the direct result of the unconstitutional Pendente Lite Order dictated by the prior judge in this matter. The record in this case clearly shows that the pendente lite decision was an abuse of discretion and that this error adversely affected the final order in the case. As such, the Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial. 32. The Court erred in granting sole custody of the minor children to Defendant because the Court apparently relied upon the Plaintiff’s contact with DHR and medical providers of the children in making its decision on this issue. The evidence in this matter fails to support the Court’s custody determination in such a way that it is plainly and palpably wrong, so the Court’s custody determination is due to be reversed. Otherwise, the Plaintiff should receive a new trial. The Court’s reliance on the Plaintiff’s contact with DHR was absolutely improper for the Court to use as a basis 12 in its custody determination. This is made clear by the testimony of the DHR social worker, Caroline Williams. On cross-examination, Ms. Williams confirmed that there were only a total of five open DHR cases relating to the Davenport children. The first report was in October 2009 when the parties were married, so it should not be considered at all. Regardless, Ms. Williams confirmed unequivocally that each and every report to DHR in this matter, regardless of whether the report was made by the Plaintiff or someone else, was reasonable and appropriate. Given that the reports were reasonable and appropriate, it is clearly wrong for the Court to use those reports as a basis in its determination of custody. Further, Ms. Williams confirmed that the visits to the emergency room and the examination by CHIPS were NOT initiated by the Plaintiff, but rather were the orders of DHR to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff simply followed the instructions of the State of Alabama. Now, the Plaintiff’s compliance with the instructions of a state administrative agency is being used by this Court to strip the Plaintiff’s children from her. Such a result is unconscionable given the fact that, according to the Defendant’s witness, the Plaintiff’s actions were reasonable and appropriate. 33. Likewise, the Court’s apparent reliance on the number of times the children were taken to a doctor while in the custody of the Plaintiff so fails to support the Court’s custody determination that it is plainly and palpably wrong. Not one witness - not one - could simply name one occasion when the Plaintiff took one or both children to a medical provider without good cause or for no good reason. The deposition of the children’s pediatrician, Dr. Melissa Wilson, was admitted into evidence. The testimony of Dr. Wilson clearly supports a finding that the Plaintiff acted reasonably with regard to the health care of the children. Most telling is Dr. Wilson’s testimony on page 158 of her deposition wherein she states: I don’t think [Plaintiff] is a hypochondriac, I think she loves her children, I think she is concerned about her children. The hip issue I think could have been dropped before it was dropped. But no harm came to Emma through any of that. Yes, some mom’s like to bring patients into the office and some don’t. And so have I seen her a lot, yes, but I -- she -- you know, some patients who are always medicine seeking, she was not doing any of that. Most of the time it was check this out, it is fine, off she went. She wasn’t looking to put them on tons of medicine or anything like that. So I think she was concerned, I don’t think she necessarily – you know, some of it some parents would have dropped earlier than she did, but no harm came throughher concerns. Clearly the evidence shows that the Plaintiff is an appropriately concerned mother who acted reasonably with regard to the health care of the children. Dr. Wilson’s testimony in that regard was not refuted. Therefore, the Court’s reliance on the Plaintiff’s decisions regarding the medical care of the children was an improper basis for its custody determination, being plainly and palpably wrong. This is especially true in light of the Defendant’s total ineptness in regard to medical issues of the children. The Defendant was forced by the Pendente Lite Order to begin participating as a father. Before that time, the Plaintiff was totally in charge of all aspects of the children’s lives, and it was the Defendant who allowed the Plaintiff to act in that role throughout the marriage. Dr. Wilson testified on page 155 of her deposition that the Plaintiff accompanied the children to all medical visits to her office until the parties separated. It was not until February 14, 2014 that the Defendant visited Dr. Wilson. The Defendant was late to the appointment, so late that the Defendant left without even seeing Dr. Wilson. And what was the purpose of the Defendant’s visit? The Defendant needed to speak to Dr. Wilson to find out what specialists Gavin was seeing and what medications Gavin was taking in order to prepare for upcoming mediation. (Dr. Wilson’s deposition, page 156). The Defendant’s actions in regard to the health care of the children did not become important until after the divorce, while the Plaintiff has always been involved in the children’s medical issues, and appropriately so according to their pediatrician. The Court’s reliance on the frequency of the Plaintiff’s contact with medical providers of the children was not an appropriate basis on which to base its custody determination because such evidence did not in any 14 way support an award of sole custody to Defendant. It was plainly and palpably wrong and is due to be amended. Alternatively, the Court should grant the Plaintiff a new trial. 34. The “Private Judge” statute, Ala. Code § 12-11A-1 through § 12-11A-8 is unconstitutional in that it violates the Plaintiff’s right to due process of law under both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Alabama of 1901. Citizens of this state have the right to have a sitting Circuit Court Judge duly elected by voters in each circuit to preside over divorce cases and related disputes. Under the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Alabama of 1901, a “private judge” has no authority whatsoever to decide such cases, and, likewise, has no jurisdiction of the parties herein. The Plaintiff should have had the opportunity to have a Shelby County Circuit Court Judge hear this divorce trial. Instead, because the trial was going to last more than one day, the Plaintiff was forced to continue living under the untenable dictates of the improper Pendente Lite Order while the case lingered in the depths of the backlogged case files of the Shelby County Circuit Court for an undetermined amount of time, or to pay a “private judge” to hear the case. The “private judge” has absolutely no accountability to the voters in this state, and, as such, has no compelling interest in creating a final order which is fair and impartial. The “private judge” statute strips litigants of their day in court before a properly sitting, duly elected judge. The statute is unconstitutional, and the private judge here had no authority or jurisdiction over the parties, so the Order of June 3, 2015 is null and void. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff prays that the Court will alter, vacate or amend its Order so as award the Plaintiff with the sole custody of the parties’ minor children, grant the Defendant standard visitation, require the Defendant to pay child support to the Plaintiff in accordance with Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration, award the martial residence to the Plaintiff, and to alter and amend its Order in each and every other manner requested herein. Alternatively, Plaintiff prays that the Court will grant a new trial in this matter. 15 Plaintiff further requests any other additional or special relief to which Plaintiff may be entitled in the premises or in equity. Plaintiff requests a hearing on this motion. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Keith E. Brashier KEITH E. BRASHIER (BRA113) BURNS, BRASHIER & JOHNSON, LLC 1475 Financial Center 505 20 th Street North Birmingham, Alabama 35203 Office (205) 241-9988 / Fax (205) 241-9984 keith@gbblaw.net CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certified that on this date I have served a copy of the above and foregoing electronically via the Alabama Judicial System E-filing system upon the following: Sammye Oden Kok, Esq. 1130 22 nd Street South, Suite 4000 Birmingham, AL 35205 /s/Keith E. Brashier OF COUNSEL