I am grateful to the distinguished lawyer, Bruce Ackerman to reproduce part of his article where he writes that over the past three years, the nationalist/cosmopolitans under the age of 35 have overwhelming voted to Remain while the nationalist/nationalists over-65 have closed ranks behind Brexit. These high-visibility political struggles have channeled different bottom-up experiences in ways that have dramatically escalated intergenerational polarization and alienation.

Even if one views the nationalist arguments for Leave sympathetically, Brexit is likely to have disastrous long-term consequences for the overwhelming majority of Britons. While the UK would be a major player with Germany and France if it remained in the EU, it will be in a weak bargaining position if it leaves and tries to induce Brussels to provide British businesses with privileged commercial access to the 450 million citizens remaining within the Union. 

What is more, the UK’s departure will require the country to surrender the great gains Britons have-obtained by speaking English as their native language. This linguistic privilege not only gave London an immense advantage over Frankfurt as a financial center, but it helped British industry play a central role in the EU’s increasingly integrated system of production. 

At the same time, it is very unlikely that these great costs will be out-weighed by the benefits that a sovereign Britain will gain in international trade negotiations. Even assuming that Scotland and Northern Ireland remain within the United Kingdom, Westminster will only represent 60 million people – smaller than the population of Japan or Russia. Even these larger countries will play a minor role in shaping the future of world trade. The big decisions will be made by the EU and USA, for the West; and India and China, for the rising East. Britain will be a third-rate power maneuvering for advantage from the sidelines. 

Nevertheless, despite Brexit’s devastating long-term impact on the economic future of most Britons, Boris Johnson will claim a “popular mandate” to leave the EU on the basis of his triumph at the recent parliamentary election. Yet Johnson’s victory is entirely a result of Britain’s “first-past-the-post” electoral system – as a scrutiny of the actual vote count reveals. 

The Conservatives gained a decisive 35 seat majority in the Commons, but they won only 46% of the vote -- even when the supporters of their coalition partners are included. In contrast, the political parties opposing a quick Brexit gained the support of 52% of the electorate. Looking at the raw numbers, more than two million people favored Remain over Leave. 

This raw vote count may well be deceiving. Some pro-business Conservatives wanted to Remain, but voted for Johnson because Corbyn-style Socialism seemed even worse than Brexit. Similarly, some traditional unionists stuck with Labour even though they favored Johnson’s break with Europe. 

Only one thing is clear: a “bottom-up” emphasis on Brexit’s likely impact on daily life cannot be the key factor explaining Johnson’s political success in dramatically reasserting British sovereignty. 

Here is where my “top-down” perspective plays a key role. In accounting for Johnson’s fateful step despite the 50-50 split amongst the British people. As I suggest in Revolutionary Constitutions, a crucial element in the Brexit story is the “establishmentarian” predicaments generated by David Cameron’s decision to call for a referendum by “We the People of Great Britain.” It is this appeal to direct democracy which generated the next three years of crisis as governing elites in Westminster tried and failed to reestablish their accustomed role as the authoritative representatives of the popular will. 

If my account of the tensions between the model of establishment parliamentarianism and the practice of populist referenda is valid, this not only illuminates the dynamics of political polarization in Great Britain. It also provokes further reflections on the role of referenda in other countries which have embraced elitist models of legitimacy. Most obviously, what are the similarities and differences between David Cameron’s use of a referendum on Brexit and the on-going struggle in Spain over the legitimacy of a popular referendum on Catalan independence?

Source: Bruce Ackerman, Italian Journal of Public Law, vol. 12 (July, 2020): ijpl.eu, Symposium: Revolutionary Constitutions by Bruce Ackerman Afterword: “Multiple Identities”