The Bennington Banner
425 Main Street
Bennington, VT 05201

Subject: Formal Demand for Retraction, Archive Removal, and Legal Clarification Regarding False Arrest Allegation and Law Enforcement Misconduct

Dear Editor,

I am writing to issue a formal demand for the immediate retraction and permanent removal of any articles, online content, or third-party syndications published by The Bennington Banner that falsely associate my name, Justin-Ames Gamache, with an arrest or criminal conviction. These statements are factually false, legally unsound, and professionally harmful to me as an educator and mental health professional.

To clarify, there has never been an arrest involving my name. In 2013, I received a citation to appear in court for a misdemeanor charge under 13 V.S.A. § 3002 (Impersonation of an Officer). A citation is not an arrest under Vermont law. Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 3 makes clear that a citation is a written summons to appear in court and does not constitute detention, restraint, or custodial arrest. The Vermont Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed this legal distinction. In State v. Berard, 154 Vt. 306, 577 A.2d 118 (1990), and State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171, 598 A.2d 119 (1991), the Court held that a citation does not equate to an arrest unless it involves actual or constructive restraint of liberty. Similarly, in State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 449 A.2d 502 (1982), the Court reaffirmed that an arrest constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and must involve some form of custody or physical control. I was never handcuffed, detained, or otherwise subjected to any custodial action—therefore, no arrest occurred in 2013 or at any other time.

The 2013 citation stemmed from a non-emergency call placed by a neighbor, Mr. Mangiacotti, who misused police services to provoke unwarranted state involvement. The use of a non-emergency phone line, rather than 911, makes it evident that there was no urgent threat or criminal activity taking place. Nevertheless, the responding officer, Trooper Lauren Ronan, issued a citation without conducting even the most basic investigatory procedures. No phone records were reviewed, no voice identification was performed, and no independent corroboration was obtained. This lack of verification falls short of legal standards governing probable cause. In State v. Bailey, 157 Vt. 481, 602 A.2d 927 (1991), the Vermont Supreme Court held that probable cause must rest on reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances—not hearsay or speculation.

Trooper Ronan’s failure to investigate the claim and subsequent issuance of a citation constitutes an abuse of authority under both state and federal law. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is a violation of constitutional rights when an officer acting under color of law deprives a person of liberty without legal justification. The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), confirms that qualified immunity does not protect officials who act in clear violation of established law. Additionally, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), established that public officials are not entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable person in their position would have known their conduct was unlawful. In this case, the lack of probable cause and failure to verify evidence was so obvious that no reasonable officer could claim ignorance. Indeed, Trooper Ronan’s conduct reflects a level of willful disregard so profound that, to paraphrase the Court’s logic, she “wouldn’t have recognized wrongdoing if it had been directly in front of her.” This is the precise threshold under which qualified immunity dissolves: where a reasonable officer would have known they were violating the Constitution.

Furthermore, the charge under 13 V.S.A. § 3002 is not a predicate offense under Vermont’s expungement statutes. According to 13 V.S.A. § 8002(9) and § 7602(a), only specified offenses disqualify an individual from seeking expungement. Impersonation of an Officer is not one of them. I have fulfilled all legal obligations associated with the citation and am fully eligible to have the record cleared (more so dismissed and sealed due to misclassification of Vermont state statute). Any publication that implies otherwise is misleading, inaccurate, and in violation of my right to be free from the continued burden of a resolved legal matter. 

This matter is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it proceeded under a misclassified charge. The offense for which I was cited—Impersonation of an Officer under 13 V.S.A. § 3002—was procedurally and factually misrepresented, and this misclassification resulted in a violation of my constitutional rights, particularly under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is well established that the government may not deprive a person of liberty without lawful process, and the foundation of that process must rest on accurate classification of offenses, lawful application of rules, and informed consent of the accused.

I reserve every legal right to speak out against this misclassification, to challenge the procedural defects surrounding the case, and to withdraw or redact any implied or coerced apologies made under the pressure of a flawed legal process. As held in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), a guilty plea must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently (it’s easy to assume the state attorney accepted a voluntarily and knowingly plea because they themselves are overly punitive, just doing their jobs). Where a plea is entered without full awareness of the legal consequences—particularly in a context involving misapplied charges or incomplete advisement—the resulting conviction is constitutionally infirm. I was advised to plead under circumstances that did not meet this constitutional threshold, and therefore, the plea cannot be presumed valid. Because the record and this correspondence already establish the factual and legal foundation of my innocence, and because the actions taken against me involved violations of both procedural and substantive due process, it would not require a trial to determine what is evident: that no arrest occurred, that no emergency justified the citation, and that no conviction lawfully stands under Vermont or federal constitutional standards. The U.S. Supreme Court in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), reaffirmed that justice cannot stand on a foundation of misleading or inaccurate representations by the state (and no law enforcement word on this matter is final when the initial report from trooper Lauren Ronan stated no proper investigation (personally read the report due to a FOIA REQUEST) and according to emails mocking me by such officials. The record, supported by statute and binding precedent, confirms that “Mr. Gamache’s legal position is grounded in merit. Any continuation by Vermont State Police in the absence of lawful cause would constitute a clear abuse of authority and a violation of his constitutional rights.” Any continuation by Vermont state police would be unjust and a continued violation of my constitutional rights as the U.S. Supreme Court has held in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), that government actors who intentionally misuse their power to harass or interfere with individual liberty violate constitutional protections. Furthermore, continued pursuit or mischaracterization in the absence of probable cause (despite what the judge may have concluded for probable cause), or after exculpatory evidence has been provided, may constitute selective enforcement or retaliatory prosecution—both impermissible under Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), and Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, any action taken by law enforcement that deprives a citizen of liberty or reputation without legal basis may result in civil liability. If Vermont State Police or affiliated agencies persist in efforts to classify, stigmatize, or monitor Mr. Gamache based on disproven or resolved matters, such action would represent not only a continued abuse of police discretion, but a violation of clearly established constitutional law, for which qualified immunity would not apply (Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)).

Therefore, any further attempt by the Vermont State Police to pursue or misrepresent Mr. Gamache in connection with the resolved 2013 citation would be legally unjust, ethically indefensible, and a direct violation of both state statute and federal constitutional safeguards. And any attempt by the Vermont State Police to make a new criminal investigation would be unjustly sound and a abuse of power Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).

In the interest of justice, and to preserve public confidence in lawful process, the appropriate course of action is to formally dismiss or nullify the matter. Continued misrepresentation or refusal to correct these violations risks not only legal liability but erosion of the public’s trust in law enforcement and the press.

The continued public circulation of false and damaging claims constitutes defamation. Under Vermont common law, as established in Lange v. Town of Newbury, 152 Vt. 561, 568 A.2d 1263 (1989), and further clarified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558, defamation requires four elements: (1) publication of a statement, (2) falsity, (3) fault amounting to at least negligence, and (4) reputational harm. Your publication meets all of these criteria. Moreover, once made aware of a factual inaccuracy, a media outlet has a duty to correct the public record. This duty is reaffirmed by the Vermont Supreme Court in Russin v. Wesson, 2003 VT 47. Failure to issue a correction in light of clear legal notice increases the publication’s exposure to liability. Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), continued publication after notification may also rise to the level of actual malice.

Accordingly, I formally demand: (1) immediate retraction of any and all articles linking me to an arrest; (2) permanent removal of my name and case from all digital archives, web pages, search indexes, and third-party content providers; (3) a written correction stating that no arrest ever occurred and that the citation did not constitute a custodial act or conviction; and (4) a public acknowledgment that law enforcement acted without verified probable cause and that no emergency was ever present.

For the avoidance of doubt, the publication of this letter, or any prior or future letter on this matter, does not grant your editorial board or parent company any right to enter a legal plea, mount a public-facing rebuttal, or preemptively seek summary judgment. This is not a notice of opportunity to plead or a waiver of my right to fair adjudication. Any attempt to assert authority based on editorial silence, selective interpretation, or internal summaries not based on fact would violate procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Vermont’s fair trial protections under Chapter I, Article 10. Any pretextual or biased interpretation in place of proper legal process will be challenged under Rule 56 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure, and controlling federal precedent including Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), which holds that summary judgment is only appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact—and not when factual disputes or legal mischaracterizations exist.

Please consider this letter as both a legal notice and a preservation request for any and all documents related to your publication. I am prepared to pursue all legal remedies under Vermont and federal law should this matter not be corrected promptly.

I trust that The Bennington Banner will act in accordance with journalistic ethics, state law, and constitutional principles by correcting the public record. Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Respectfully,
Justin-Ames Gamache, M.Ed., M.S.

References

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).

Lange v. Town of Newbury, 152 Vt. 561, 568 A.2d 1263 (1989).

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

Russin v. Wesson, 2003 VT 47.

State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 449 A.2d 502 (1982).

State v. Bailey, 157 Vt. 481, 602 A.2d 927 (1991).

State v. Berard, 154 Vt. 306, 577 A.2d 118 (1990).

State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171, 598 A.2d 119 (1991).

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).

Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

Statutes and Rules

13 V.S.A. § 3002. Impersonation of an officer.

13 V.S.A. § 7602(a). Expungement; sealing of criminal history records.

13 V.S.A. § 8002(9). Definitions.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights.

Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 3. Citation to appear.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558.