Charles Walter Weber Jr. is restrained pursuant to a judgment and sentence entered in State v. Weber, Walla Walla County Cause No. 04-1-00534-2, and is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Charles is unlawfully restrained because his conviction and sentence were obtained in violation of: The Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Article I, §§ 14 and 22 of the Washington Constitution. The errors described below constitute structural constitutional error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and unconstitutional sentencing, each independently requiring relief. Ground One – Jury Selection Charles was denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury where multiple jurors disclosed personal, social, and religious relationships with the prosecuting attorney, including one juror who admitted his respect for the prosecutor “may” influence his judgment, and trial counsel failed to remove biased jurors. Ground Two – Sentencing / Third Strike Whether Charles sentence of life without parole violates the Eighth Amendment, Article I, §14, and due process, where the third strike arose from a prison-based fight, and the sentencing court failed to conduct a meaningful proportionality analysis. GROUND ONE DENIAL OF IMPARTIAL JURY (STRUCTURAL ERROR) A. Facts – Jury Selection Voir dire occurred on February 15, 2004. (RP 10–12; RP 20) 1. Juror Marshall Keymer Juror Marshall Keymer disclosed that he served with Prosecutor Gabriel E. Acosta on an ongoing finance committee, meeting monthly, and that he served as chairman. When asked if this would affect his impartiality, Juror Keymer stated: “I respect him greatly and so it may.” (RP 10–12) Rather than immediately excusing Juror Keymer, the court continued questioning him in front of the entire venire, allowing repeated expressions of respect for the prosecutor. Although Juror Keymer was later dismissed, his statements tainted the remaining jury pool. 2. Juror June P. Ferguson Juror June P. Ferguson disclosed that she attended the same church as Prosecutor Acosta. She was not challenged and served as Juror #3, participating in the guilty verdict. 3. Juror James A. McEwen Juror James A. McEwen disclosed that: His children attended school with the prosecutor’s children; He saw the prosecutor at basketball games; and He had dinner at the prosecutor’s home. Despite this social relationship, Juror McEwen was seated as Juror #12. 4. Juror Judy A. Emery Juror Judy A. Emery disclosed a prior relationship with Gary Pierce, a State witness, through a shared youth group. She was permitted to remain on the jury and assess his credibility. (RP 20, ln. 6–16) B. Law – Structural Error The Sixth Amendment guarantees a jury “indifferent as between the State and the accused.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). Juror bias—actual or implied—constitutes structural error, requiring reversal without harmless-error analysis. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); State v. Brett, 126 Wn.2d 136 (1995); State v. Irby, 187 Wn.2d 412 (2017). Allowing jurors with personal relationships to the prosecutor—and exposing the venire to bias-inducing statements—destroyed the structural integrity of the trial. C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Trial counsel’s failure to remove Jurors Ferguson and McEwen fell below objective standards of reasonableness and cannot be justified as strategy. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). GROUND TWO UNLAWFUL THIRD STRIKE / DISPROPORTIONATE SENTENCE A. Facts – Third Strike Conviction Charles's third strike arose from a physical altercation occurring inside a prison cell, within a custodial environment where: Retreat was impossible; Self-protection pressures were inherent; and Ordinary assumptions of criminal intent do not apply. Absent this conviction, Charles would have been released in January 2026. B. Failure to Conduct Proportionality Review Washington courts must conduct meaningful proportionality analysis when imposing life without parole. State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d 387 (1980). The sentencing court failed to meaningfully consider: The custodial setting; Mitigating circumstances unique to incarceration; and Whether life without parole was justified. C. Eighth Amendment – Gross Disproportionality A sentence is unconstitutional if it is grossly disproportionate. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). Imposing life without parole for a prison-based fight shocks the conscience and violates both federal and state constitutional protections. D. Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing Trial counsel failed to: Present mitigation regarding prison conditions; Challenge POAA application; Argue proportionality. This independently violated Charles's constitutional rights. IV. PREJUDICE Charles suffered: A structurally invalid trial, and An unconstitutional life sentence. The restraint is unlawful and ongoing.