A Call for International Action on Direct-to-Attack and One-Way Attack Drones
Uncrewed aerial systems have transformed modern warfare.

Technology that was once primarily associated with reconnaissance, photography, research, racing, and civilian applications can now be adapted into an inexpensive precision-guided weapon. Small first-person-view drones can carry explosive payloads and be deliberately flown into a target, destroying both the aircraft and the target in the process.

These systems are commonly called FPV attack drones, kamikaze drones, suicide drones, direct-to-attack drones, or one-way attack UAS.

This petition concerns a proposed international prohibition or specific treaty restriction on the use of these systems as direct-to-person weapons.

The technology has changed faster than the rules surrounding it.
International humanitarian law already governs the conduct of hostilities regardless of the weapon involved. Attacks must distinguish between civilians and military objectives, disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks are prohibited, and feasible precautions must be taken to minimize civilian harm.

Armed drones themselves are not currently prohibited as a category under international humanitarian law.

The question raised by this petition is narrower:

Should an inexpensive aircraft intentionally designed or configured to destroy itself by carrying an explosive or other lethal payload directly into a human target remain treated exactly like other conventional weapons, or does this emerging class of weapon warrant its own international restrictions?

The rapid proliferation of one-way attack drones has made that question increasingly important.

FPV drones have dramatically lowered the barrier to precision attack.
Traditional precision-guided weapons historically required sophisticated manufacturing, specialized launch platforms, substantial logistical support, and significant financial resources.

Small commercial and hobby-derived drones have changed that equation.

A relatively inexpensive aircraft assembled from commercially available motors, flight controllers, cameras, radio equipment, batteries, and airframes can be modified to carry an explosive payload and remotely guided toward a target.

The same technological ecosystem that made FPV flight accessible to hobbyists, students, engineers, filmmakers, and researchers can therefore also provide many of the fundamental components required for a one-way attack system.

This accessibility creates a proliferation challenge extending beyond traditional military powers.

The humanitarian consequences require serious examination.
The International Committee of the Red Cross has specifically identified humanitarian concerns associated with FPV and one-way attack drones. Among those concerns are limitations in camera quality that can make target identification more difficult, challenges in assessing civilian presence, and the possibility that an armed drone that fails to reach its intended target may remain an explosive hazard.

Recent United Nations reporting has also documented substantial civilian harm associated with short-range drones in active conflicts.

These incidents do not mean that every use of an FPV or one-way attack drone violates international law. The legality of an attack remains dependent upon the target, circumstances, method of attack, and compliance with applicable international humanitarian law.

They do demonstrate why this rapidly proliferating technology deserves focused international examination.

This issue is not about banning drones.
Any international framework considered for one-way attack systems should make a clear distinction between the weaponization of the technology and the technology itself.

FPV and uncrewed aircraft have enormous legitimate value.

They are used for:

search and rescue;
emergency response;
infrastructure inspection;
agriculture;
scientific research;
photography and filmmaking;
logistics;
education and STEM programs;
competitive racing and recreation;
training and threat replication;
reconnaissance and situational awareness.
None of these applications are the subject of this proposal.

Nor should a regulation aimed at one-way attack weapons unnecessarily restrict civilian FPV aircraft, conventional unarmed drones, defensive counter-UAS technology, or legitimate research and training systems.

The relevant distinction is purpose and configuration.

The proposed category concerns an uncrewed aircraft intentionally configured so that its terminal function is to deliver lethal force by carrying its payload into a target while sacrificing or destroying the aircraft itself.

Remote control and autonomy should also be treated separately.
Not every one-way attack drone is an autonomous weapon.

Many FPV attack drones remain under direct human control until impact. Other systems may incorporate navigation, computer vision, target recognition, terminal guidance, or autonomous target-selection functions.

Those technologies raise overlapping but distinct legal questions.

International discussions concerning lethal autonomous weapon systems are already examining the degree of human judgment and control that should be required when machines can select and engage targets without further human intervention.

Any future framework addressing one-way attack drones should therefore distinguish between remotely piloted weapons, in which a human operator selects and attacks the target, and autonomous weapons, in which software performs some or all of those critical functions.

Clear terminology matters.
The term kamikaze drone is widely understood but is not sufficiently precise for an international legal instrument.

A future international framework could instead establish a technically defined category such as:

One-Way Attack Uncrewed Aerial System (OWA-UAS): an uncrewed aerial vehicle designed, configured, or employed to deliver a lethal or explosive effect through intentional terminal impact or detonation in which the aircraft itself functions as, carries, or becomes part of the munition.

A narrower category could specifically address systems deliberately employed against individual human targets.

The exact definition would require careful work by governments, military legal experts, engineers, humanitarian organizations, and international-law specialists to avoid unintended restrictions on legitimate civilian or defensive technologies.

The international community now faces a policy decision.
The underlying technologies will continue to develop.

Aircraft will become less expensive. Computer vision will improve. Navigation will become more resilient. Manufacturing will become easier. Autonomy will become increasingly accessible.

The relevant international-policy question is therefore not whether drone technology will continue to advance.

It will.

The question is what rules should govern the point at which that technology becomes a disposable, directly guided lethal weapon.

This petition is intended to place that question before governments, international organizations, humanitarian-law experts, defense professionals, engineers, and the public, and to establish a serious international discussion regarding specific legal limits on direct-to-attack and one-way attack UAS.

Any resulting framework should preserve legitimate civilian drone technology, recognize lawful defensive and non-weapon applications, maintain existing protections under international humanitarian law, and define precisely which weapon systems and methods of employment fall within its scope.

The emergence of inexpensive one-way attack drones represents a significant development in warfare.

How the international community chooses to regulate that development is a question that warrants clear definitions, credible evidence, and deliberate consideration before the technology becomes even more widespread.