https://theconversation.com/hugh-white-why-the-aukus-dream-was-never-realistic-and-is-likely-to-die-259028?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20June%2017%202025%20-%203415334815&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20June%2017%202025%20-%203415334815+CID_94a747e7db4d5ffda4f912e3e4e69017&utm_source=campaign_monitor&utm_term=Hugh%20White%20why%20the%20AUKUS%20dream%20was%20never%20realistic%20and%20is%20likely%20to%20die

The first clear sign the Trump administration was taking a long hard look at AUKUS came two weeks ago, when US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth gave his first major speech on US strategic policy in Asia at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

In a long presentation that catalogued a host of initiatives with America’s Asian allies, AUKUS was not mentioned once. This was noteworthy, because under the Biden administration, AUKUS was the poster-child for US military engagement in the region, name-checked at every opportunity. Now we understand why.

The Pentagon’s review of AUKUS, announced last week, marks the first time any of the three partners – the US, United Kingdom and Australia – has tested the AUKUS dream against hard military and strategic realities. It is unlikely to survive.

AUKUS was always a long shot, right from the start. That was clear from the moment, back in September 2021, that then prime minister, Scott Morrison, sprung the dream of an Australian nuclear-powered submarine force on an astonished public. For that dream to be realised, a lot of things would have to go right, and most of them were much more likely to go wrong.

But the flaw that now looks set to kill the AUKUS dream is one that was not part of the original plan. The way Morrison and his then defence minister, Peter Dutton, originally conceived it, there would be no need for Australia to acquire US-built Virginia-Class subs in the 2030s before taking delivery of Australian-built subs to replace the Collins-class boats. They were confident that new subs built in Australia, almost certainly to a British design, could be delivered fast enough to enter service as the old Collins subs were being retired, ensuring no gap in our capability.

It only became clear this was not going to work out after Labor took office in 2022, as the new government tried to turn Morrison’s vague idea into a viable project. It soon found there was simply no way to bring new Australian-built nuclear subs into service until long after the Collins boats had to be retired.