Petition Closed

94
Supporters

We The People, petition the Supreme Court on behalf of Joe Grumbine, to issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Mandate, Prohibition, Quo Warranto, or Other Appropriate Immediate Relief against all lower courts in the Case #NA087478 of Joe Grumbine for the following grounds:
There is enough probable cause as evidenced by court reporter’s transcripts and witness testimony to believe that the politically motivated charges against Mr. Grumbine and his current incarceration; may be unconstitutional, of material waste to the limited State resources of the Courts, and in violation of basic human rights as protected by the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.
In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the only limitation imposed by the bail clause is that "the government's proposed conditions of release or detention not be 'excessive' in light of the perceived evil."
“It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court" (Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 71 S. Ct. 576, 95 L. Ed. 774 [1951]
In light of allegations of continuing malfeasance of Justice, and WHEREFORE, the recent bail revocation hearing is currently under review for formal investigation by the California Commission on Judicial Performance and the State Bar of California for flagrant prosecutorial misconduct in full public view, and in light of the well-documented fact that Joe Grumbine is an upstanding citizen journalist and member of the global and local communities who has acted in full compliance and cooperation with every court order, and presents absolutely NO Flight Risk WHATSOEVER.
WHEREFORE, the People have exhausted all other adequate remedies available the day before the Internationally recognized religious holiday to Give Thanks and Right the Wrongs of Criminal Injustices under the Color of Law and Colonialization; and Joe Grumbine, his family, and religious community of Willow Creek Springs will suffer irreparable harm if the writ is not granted;
WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Prays for the California State Supreme Court to issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Prohibition, Mandate, Quo Warranto, or Other Appropriate Extraordinary IMMEDIATE RELIEF INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE ON HIS OWN RECOGNIZANCE, OF JOE GRUMBINE, against the lower Superior courts of California, from any and all charges in the Case of Joe Grumbine.
In light of the irreparable damage being caused to Mr. Grumbine’s family and community, by continuing kangaroo court proceedings conducted “in flagrante delicto” at the very location of Mr. Grumbine’s being unconstitutionally remanded into custody, the Petitioner Prays for a STAY and/or Change of Venue be issued for any and all further proceedings involving this controversial international case In the Interest of Justice.

 

ARGUMENTS

In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the only limitation imposed by the bail clause is that "the government's proposed conditions of release or detention not be 'excessive' in light of the perceived evil."
Federal statutes (28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2256) outline the procedural aspects of federal habeas proceedings. There are two prerequisites for habeas review: the petitioner must be in custody when the petition is filed, and a prisoner who is held in state government custody must have exhausted all state remedies, including state appellate review. Any federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who is within its jurisdiction. The habeas petition must be in writing and signed and verified either by the petitioner seeking relief or by someone acting on his or her behalf. The petition must name the custodian as the respondent and state the facts concerning the applicant’s custody and include the legal basis for the request.
Due process requires dismissal when the government’s conduct is so grossly shocking that it violated that “fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal standard of justice mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (U.S. v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-432, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1973)).
The federal courts have long recognized outrageous government conduct as a viable defense, based on a violation of the due process clause (Greene v. U.S., 454 F .2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971)) Examples of such outrageous conduct have occurred when law enforcement agents used a friend to induce a defendant to commit a crime [citations], physical abuse (Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952)); and interference with attorney-client relationship (Boulas v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 422, 233 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1986)).
In U.S. v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-436, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366, 93 (1973), the Supreme Court recognized that situations may arise where the “conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction.” Although no California court has directly found on this ground, the courts have recognized there can be situations in which the government’s conduct in investigating, arresting or prosecuting a defendant is so outrageous a conviction would deny the defendant due process of law. (People v. Wesley, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1130, 1138, 1142-1144, 274 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990); People v. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th 48, 85-86, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623, 990 P .2d 506 (2000); People v. Holloway, 47 Cal. App. 4th 1757, 1767, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (1996)) “California cases have treated this defense as viable.” (People v. Thoi, 213 Cal. App. 3d 689, 696, 261 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1989)) As the California Supreme Court observed in People v. McIntire, 23 Cal. 3d 742, 748, 153 Cal. Rptr. 237, 591 P .2d 527 (1979), “sufficiently gross police conduct could conceivably lead to a finding that conviction of the accused would violate his constitutional right to due process of the law.”
The courts have identified four factors that should be considered in determining whether due process principles had been violated by outrageous police conduct: “(1) whether the police manufactured a crime which otherwise would not likely have occurred, or merely involved themselves in an ongoing criminal activity [citations]; (2) whether the police themselves engaged in criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a sense of justice [citations]; (3) whether the defendant’s reluctance to commit the crime is overcome by appeals to humanitarianism instincts such as sympathy or past friendship, by temptation of exorbitant gain, or by persistent solicitation in the face of unwillingness [citation]; and (4) whether that record reveals simply a desire to obtain a conviction with no reading that the police motive is to prevent further crime or protect the populace.” (People v. Wesley, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1130, 1142, 274 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990))
In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), the Supreme Court assumed arguendo that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court ruled that it did apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Justice Brennan wrote, "There are, then, four principles by which we may determine whether a particular punishment is 'cruel and unusual'."
* The "essential predicate" is "that a punishment must not by its severity be degrading to human dignity," especially torture.
* "A severe punishment that is obviously inflicted in wholly arbitrary fashion."
* "A severe punishment that is clearly and totally rejected throughout society."
* "A severe punishment that is patently unnecessary."
Justice Brennan also wrote that he expected no state would pass a law obviously violating any one of these principles, so court decisions regarding the Eighth Amendment would involve a "cumulative" analysis of the implication of each of the four principles. In this way, the United States Supreme Court "set the standard that a punishment would be cruel and unusual [,if] it was too severe for the crime, [if] it was arbitrary, if it offended society's sense of justice, or if it was not more effective than a less severe penalty."
In the case of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the Supreme Court held that incarceration, standing alone, could constitute cruel and unusual punishment if it were "disproportionate" in duration to the offense. The Court outlined three factors that were to be considered in determining if the sentence is excessive: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), established the principal that the deliberate failure of prison authorities to address the medical needs of an inmate constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment".[1] It held that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'...proscribed by the Eighth Amendment."
In the case of Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), Justice Blackmun’s opinion states, “Where a legislature refuses to fund a prison adequately, the resulting barbaric conditions should not be immune from constitutional scrutiny simply because no prison official acted culpably. [...] The responsibility for subminimal conditions in any prison inevitably is diffuse, and often borne at least in part, by the legislature. Yet, regardless of what state actor or institution caused the harm and with what intent, the experience of the inmate is the same. A punishment is simply no less cruel or unusual because its harm is unintended. In view of this obvious fact, there is no reason to believe that, in adopting the Eighth Amendment, the Framers intended to prohibit cruel and unusual punishments only when they were inflicted intentionally.”
In in re gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967), a case that established that children in juvenile court have the right to due process, the Court reasoned, "Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." Associate Justice william o. douglas once wrote, "[W]here police take matters in their own hands, seize victims, beat and pound them until they confess, there cannot be the slightest doubt that the police have deprived the victim of a right under the Constitution. It is the right of the accused to be tried by a legally constituted court, not by a kangaroo court" (Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 71 S. Ct. 576, 95 L. Ed. 774 [1951]).

POINTS & AUTHORITIES

CASES
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)
U.S. v. Russell 411 U.S. 423, 431-432, 93 S. Ct. 1637, 36 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1973)
People v. McIntire, 23 Cal. 3d 742, 748, 153 Cal. Rptr. 237, 591 P .2d 527 (1979)
People v. Thoi, 213 Cal. App. 3d 689, 695-696, 261 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1989)
People v. Wesley, 224 Cal. App. 3d 1130, 1138, 1142-1144, 274 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990)
People v. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th 48, 85-86, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623, 990 P .2d 547 (2000)
People v. Holloway, 47 Cal. App. 4th 1757, 1767, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547 (1996)
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952)
Boulas v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 422, 233 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1986)
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)
Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 71 S. Ct. 576, 95 L. Ed. 774 [1951]
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967)

STATUTES
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2256
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution for The United States of America
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution for The United States of America
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution for The United States of America
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 10, which states: "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Articles 14 & 16, which is binding in international law on the 72 states that have ratified it. Article 14(1) establishes the basic right to a fair trial, article 14(2) provides for the presumption of innocence, and article 14(3) sets out a list of minimum fair trial rights in criminal proceedings. Article 14(5) establishes the right of a convicted person to have a higher court review the conviction or sentence, and article 14(7) prohibits double jeopardy. Article 14(1) states that: "All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children."
American Convention on Human Rights, Articles 3, 4, 8, 9, and 10
Title 42, U.S.C., Section 14141 makes it unlawful for state or local law enforcement agencies to allow officers to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives persons of rights protected by the Constitution or U.S. laws. This law, commonly referred to as the Police Misconduct Statute, gives the Department of Justice authority to seek civil remedies in cases where law enforcement agencies have policies or practices that foster a pattern of misconduct by employees. This action is directed against an agency, not against individual officers. The types of issues which may initiate a pattern and practice investigation include:
* Lack of supervision/monitoring of officers' actions;
* Lack of justification or reporting by officers on incidents involving the use of force;
* Lack of, or improper training of, officers; and
* Citizen complaint processes that treat complainants as adversaries.
Under Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1997, the Department of Justice has the ability to initiate civil actions against mental hospitals, retardation facilities, jails, prisons, nursing homes, and juvenile detention facilities when there are allegations of systemic derivations of the constitutional rights of institutionalized persons.
Third Geneva Convention of 1929
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949

OTHER AUTHORITIES
California State Bar Professional Rules of Conduct
Abraham Lincoln’s words “We the people are the rightful masters of both Congress and the courts, not to overthrow the Constitution but to overthrow the men who pervert the Constitution.”
All Court Reporter’s Transcripts of Proceedings for the Case #NA087478 of Joe Grumbine
Title 18, USC, Section 4 states, “Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both”.
Title 42, USC, Section 1986, states that “Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action; and if the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such action therefor, and may recover not exceeding $5,000 damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued.”
Title 42, USC, Section 1987 states, “The United States attorneys, marshals, and deputy marshals, the United States magistrate judges appointed by the district and territorial courts, with power to arrest, imprison, or bail offenders, and every other officer who is especially empowered by the President, are authorized and required, at the expense of the United States, to institute prosecutions against all persons violating any of the provisions of section 1990 of this title or of sections 5506 to 5516 and 5518 to 5532 of the Revised Statutes, and to cause such persons to be arrested, and imprisoned or bailed, for trial before the court of the United States or the territorial court having cognizance of the offense.
Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint For Injunctive and Declaratory Relief filed on July 9, 2012 by ACLU attorney Jeffrey Douglas against Steve Cooley and Sheriff Leroy Baca.
8.204 section e 2C regarding Noncomplying briefs, which states, it is not a fatal mistake to request an incorrect writ in the initial petition, so long as the petition alleges facts sufficient to show that the petitioner is prima facie entitled to one of the writs. The reviewing court can save a formally defective petition by construing it to cure the defects.”

Letter to
Supreme Court Justices
California State House
California State Senate
and 1 other
California Governor
Free Joe Grumbine