Genocide, along with all identity-based conflict, is as much about territorial control as it is about the perceived security threats from the targeted groups. As Toft demonstrates in The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory, state leaders see the indivisibility of territory as essential to the survival of the state. Consequently, governments seeks territorial gains and consolidation during genocide. If the genocidal regime survive after the end of the genocide-Serbia and Darfur, they will likely resist future attempts to change the territorial landscape in the country.
In contrast, the RPF victory in Rwanda led Hutus to flee to neighboring Burundi and the DRC; where violence rooted in territorial control continues to this day. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge was ousted from power by Vietnamese intervention in 1978 (although the Khmer Rouge officially held territory into the late-1990s); and thus was unable to maintain control of either the urban nor rural areas of Cambodia. Finally, the Nazi regime was obliterated by the Allied victory in World War Two, thus ending the existence of the state.
These contrasting cases highlight the difficulties of modern cases of genocide as it relates to the issue of territory. Unless the perpetrators of genocide are vanquished via military victory, they will still maintain (Serbia and Sudan) or seek to recapture (Hutus) territorial control of territory. The consequences for the people living in these contentious territories will remain perilous, as groups and state regimes struggle to secure the territory that is so vital to their identity.
(via Gleektopia: http://bit.ly/uiEKz)